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The Losing Battle: Veterans’ Backlogged Mental Health Issues Need
Reinforcements
Daniel Gilbert
Daniel.Gilbert@student.shu.edu
President Barack Obama
used the recent “State of the Union” address to definitively end
the war in Afghanistan. Approximately 34,000 American servicemen and women will come home
by the end of this year with the
remaining 32,000 soldiers home
by 2014’s end.1 But at what cost?
Our servicemen and women constantly place themselves in
harm’s way, sacrificing their
lives and their limbs to ensure
American victories. It goes without saying that these honorable
men and women deserve our support. Yet the support they need
extends beyond a hug and a
handshake; a job and a paycheck;
and a home. These heroes also
need accessible mental health
services as the incidence of mental health problems among returning soldiers continues to rise.
One report by the Congressional Research Service, specifically a statistical analysis of
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars
produced by members and committees of Congress, estimated
there are currently 50,450
wounded soldiers as a result of
these conflicts.2 Yet, some believe this figure is, at best, a very
conservative estimate. Former
Congressman Bob Filner estimates that over one million veterans have sought help from the
United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”).3 Secretary

ders and accounts for a disproportionately large proportion of utilization and costs for the VA”.6 Another
study suggests that 834,467 veterans
have sought VA healthcare since
being discharged. Of these veterans,
444,551 (53%) have been diagnosed
with “mental disorders” – though the
study notes that this number might
encompass an individual veteran
multiple times due to multiple diagnoses.7 Whether out of pride or inability to access resources, many veterans are reluctant to seek help. This
issue must be addressed as our veterans with mental disorders cannot
continue to be left without proper
services.
The VA claims on its web
site that up to 20 of every 100 VeterTHE 2013 CONGRESSIONans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars
AL RESEARCH SERVICE
suffer from PTSD. These numbers
SURVEY REPORTS THAT
parallel those of America’s most re103,792 DEPLOYED SERcent wars: 10 of every 100 Gulf War
VICE MEMBERS WERE DIVeterans and approximately 30 of
AGNOSED WITH PTSD AS
every 100 Vietnam Veterans.8 These
OF DECEMBER 7, 2012.
figures are unacceptable and further
illustrate the need for better access
tions like Post Traumatic Stress to mental health services for our vetDisorder (PTSD), Traumatic erans. The 2013 Congressional ReBrain Injury (TBI), and depres- search Service survey reports that
sion have also gone unreported. 103,792 deployed service members
One VA-commissioned study, were diagnosed with PTSD as of
conducted by RAND Health of December 7, 2012.9 These numbers
The RAND Corporation and the are skewed for a few reasons. First, a
Altarum Institute, found veterans service member might have develwith schizophrenia, bipolar disor- oped PTSD before deployment. Disder, PTSD, major depressive dis- tinguishing when a service member
order, and substance use disorder first demonstrated PTSD symptoms
“[comprised] a large and growing is often a difficult task. Second, the
number of veterans with severe Army Office of the Surgeon General
and complex general medical, qualifies that a diagnosis of PTSD is
mental, and substance-use disor- validated when an individual has
of Veterans Affairs Eric Shinseki
further states that the most recent
data indicates “roughly 67%” of
the approximately 1.4 million
veterans returning from the recent conflicts rely on aid, compensation, or support from the
VA.4 One unpublished study provided by the VA, entitled “VA
Benefits Activity: Veterans Deployed To The Global War On
Terror,” stated that through May
2012, there were 1,634,569 veterans from post-9/11 conflicts, of
which 46% have filed disability
claims.5
Further, the unseen illnesses and mental health condi-

VOLUME VI, ISSUE 2

PAGE 6

‘The Losing Battle’
accumulated “at least two outpatient visits or one or more hospitalizations at which PTSD was
diagnosed. The threshold of two
or more outpatient visits is used
in the Defense Medical Surveillance System to increase the likelihood that the individual has, or
had, PTSD.”10 If a veteran visits a
VA to get a consultation but does
not have a subsequent follow up
visit, a PTSD diagnosis is not
considered valid by the Army
Office of the Surgeon General.
This lack of diagnosis may be
due to a lack of adequate resources, funding and able medical professionals.
These figures tell a deeper
tale – one not anticipated by civilians, the Department of Defense (“DoD”), or the VA. Perhaps the departments failed to
identify the potential problems
that an increase in wounded service members would cause, or
perhaps they did not want to
share the information with the
rest of the country. Either way,
progress and reform is necessary.
Finally, improvement is on the
horizon.
During a joint hearing
before the House Armed Services
Committee and the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee, Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Eric
Shinseki discussed the major
problems facing today’s veterans,
and the support system entrusted
to treat them. Among the problems addressed was the proliferation of PTSD. The VA and DoD

are jointly combating these problems together, primarily with the
development of the Integrated Disability
Evaluation
System
(“IDES”).
The IDES, which has been
in use for the past two years, is advertised as “a seamless and transparent Disability Evaluation Sys-

tem”.11 The Wounded, Ill and Injured Compensation & Benefits
Handbook, administered by the
DoD, states that the IDES is now
used at more than 139 VA facilities across the country, ultimately
allowing “military members to file
a VA disability claim when they
are referred to the Disability Evaluation System.”12 According to
Secretary Panetta, the IDES has
increased the effectiveness of the
joint disability system, ensuring
that service members are cared for
quicker and more efficiently. Specifically, the time it takes to transition from military discharge to receipt of VA disability compensation has decreased by 70%, from
243 to 63 days. Additionally, the
overall time to receive disability
compensation is reduced by 26%,
from 540 (conducted separately by

DoD and VA) to 396 days jointly.13
These numbers are great,
considering where the programs
started. However, the the issue of
access to these services is still
prevalent because the number of
claims entered and benefits
sought is not expected to decrease. In fact, last May 2012, the
VA reported 904,000 claims.14
This current year’s end is expected to yield more than 1.25
million claims. The backlogged
claims, lasting longer than 125
days to be reviewed, were, for
May 2012, numbering at more
than 65%, or 550,000 of the
904,000 total claims. This number
is indicative of a larger problem
the VA and DoD cannot remedy
quickly enough: Neither the VA
or the DoD have the manpower or
resources to adequately support
our wounded heroes.
The VA and DoD need to
make changes. The status quo is
inadequate. We call these brave
Americans into combat only to
fall short on our end of the bargain. Perhaps the VA and DoD
should use private health care
companies, such as United
HealthCare, Blue Cross Blue
Shield, and Aetna. These companies have the financial resources
and qualified doctors within their
networks to care for the rising incidence of mental health problems. United HealthCare, for example, has 712,622 physicians
and health care professionals,
80,000 dentists and 5,594 hospitals within its network.15 Aetna
has over 1 million health care pro-
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fessionals, approximately 600,000
doctors and specialists, and 5,400
hospitals in network.16 Medical
treatment for veterans would be
readily available, and become
more efficient. Veterans would
not have to drive several hours
away to see a medical doctor at a
VA. A doctor within one of these
health care companies’ networks
would be available to treat a veteran. The greater availability would
help alleviate the number of backlogged claims.

The use of private health
insurance companies is only one
suggestion worth exploring by
the VA and DoD. We must deal
UP TO 20 OF EVERY 100
VETERANS OF THE IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN WARS
SUFFERS FROM PTSD.
with this challenge now. Service
for many veterans does not stop
after an honorable discharge or a
military victory. For many, the

battle continues long after they
exchange their military gear for
civilian clothes. The transition
back into society is hard
enough. We need to do what
we can and take better care of
our veterans. They have sacrificed life and limb. The time is
now for us to do our part.

VOLUME VI, ISSUE 2

PAGE 8

Surrogacy and Silence: Why State Legislatures Should Attempt to
Regulate Gestational Surrogacy Agreements
Melissa Cartine
Macartine@gmail.com
In 2011, television personalities and married couple,
Giuliana and Bill Rancic, revealed their struggle to have a
child on their television show
“Giuliana and Bill.” 1 The couple
had struggled for several years to
get pregnant through in vitro fertilization (IVF), which is one
method of assisted reproductive
technology (ART).2 In 2011,
Giuliana was diagnosed with
breast cancer and although treatment was successful for her cancer, she would not be able to conceive naturally for a number of
years due to the cancer.3 As the
couple desperately wanted to be
parents, they opted for another
form of ART, surrogacy.4 Genetically, Giuliana is the mother of
the resulting child.5 Her eggs
were combined with her husband’s sperm to form an embryo
that was implanted into the surrogate.6 This type of surrogacy is
called gestational surrogacy.7
The surrogacy process

was successful for Giuliana and
Bill as they now have a healthy,
thriving baby boy.8 While the
couple’s story appears inspiring,
the process can be riddled with
legal complexity due to a lack
of statutory regulation. In the
United States, a majority of
state legislatures have remained
silent as to the legality of surrogacy contracts and as to the
question of parental rights when
such contracts are signed. The
failure of state legislatures to
regulate in this area leaves parties without guidance and can
ultimately harm well-meaning
parents and innocent children.10
Several state courts have
developed tests to determine
parental rights when surrogacy
contracts have been entered into
because the state legislatures are
silent on the issue. New Jersey
state courts have banned surrogacy contracts as a matter of
public policy.11 California has
consistently used an intentbased test, which considers the
intending parents that initiated
the surrogacy process, to be the
legal parents of the resulting
child.12 Alternatively, Ohio departed from an intent-based test
and adopted a genetic-based
test, which considers the genetic
link between the parent and the
child to be the dispositive factor
in deciphering parental rights.13
A few states have attempted to
regulate surrogacy contracts,
either by banning them or taking a selective approach in re-

gards to what types of surrogacy
contracts the state will render enforceable.14
While the lack of regulation of surrogacy contracts does
not pose a problem in unremarkable cases, such legislative silence
can have devastating results for
some families. If the surrogacy
process goes awry, the parties that
entered in to a surrogacy agreement could spend years litigating
over whom the child’s legal parents are. As evidenced by the various tests state courts have adopted, there is not much uniformity
from state to state regarding surrogacy.
The unpredictability of
what a particular state court might
decide makes surrogacy a precarious method of ART for those in
states where no statutory guidance
or case law is provided.15 To address this problem, state legislatures should regulate gestational
surrogacy contracts as this method
has seen expansive growth over
the last decade and the utilization
of this method is only predicted to
increase with time.
Assisted Reproductive
Technology: Surrogacy
Generally, those seeking to
start a family unit have three options: natural conception, adoption, and surrogacy. Since natural
conception may not be an option
for many seeking to start a family,
they must revert to the latter two
options. If an individual or family
opts for gestational surrogacy and
utilizes its own gametes, it has a
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genetic link with the child, making it the closet option to natural
conception. Thus, it is easy to
fathom why so many families
place their faith in the surrogacy
process despite its potential legal
pitfalls due to lack of statutory
regulation.
The term surrogacy usually refers to one of two methods: gestational and traditional.
The Rancic couple opted for the
former method, which usually
creates a genetic link between
the child and at least one intending parent contracting to have a
surrogate carry their child. As
described previously, a woman’s
egg is removed and combined
with her partner’s sperm before
being implanted into a third person, the surrogate.16 If only one
or no intending parent can supply
gametes, then third party donors
could be used to supply the needed gametes.17 This would also be
considered gestational surrogacy.18 In both such arrangements,
the surrogate has no genetic link
to the child since her gametes
were not used.19 Those that
choose to can instead utilize the
surrogate’s eggs.20 This is called
traditional surrogacy and creates
a genetic link between the child
and the surrogate.21
According to the Society
of Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), gestational surrogacy is the method more frequently used today.22 However,
the Council for Responsible Genetics claims that accurate statistics are not available to deduce

how many more people have utilized this method rather than traditional surrogacy.23 Instead, the
Council for Responsible Genetics
found that studies that looked at
IVF success rates demonstrate
that the rate of gestational surrogacy has increased dramatically
and will continue to do so over
time.24 The data from IVF success
rates itself can be used to determine that gestational surrogacy
arrangements have increased because in the gestational surrogacy
process, the embryo of the intending parents is then implanted via
IVF into the surrogate’s uterus.25
The CDC requires ART clinics,
which perform IVF, to report the
success rates of IVF cycles and to
report when the patient is a gestational surrogate.26

The Council for Responsible Genetics is hesitant to conclude that gestational surrogacy is
more prevalent than traditional
surrogacy because the metric used
to determine success rates of IVF
is the IVF cycle.27 The measurement does not consider the individual, so there is no way to know
how many women actually serve
as surrogates.28 As previously
highlighted, the Council for Responsible Genetics did conclude

that the rate utilization of gestational surrogacy has increased
dramatically, doubling from 2004
to 2008.29 It was also comfortable
in predicting that the rapid growth
of gestational surrogacy was not
likely to slow in the future.30
Seminal Case Law
There are a few states that
attempt to deal with the legal issues that arise in surrogacy via the
court system and case law, and
then, some states that provide legislative guidance in regards to
surrogacy.31 Specifically, there
are two seminal surrogacy cases
that are cited extensively: In Re
Baby M and Johnson v. Calvert.
The traditional method of
surrogacy was used by the Stern
family in In re Baby M.32 In this
case, the Sterns entered into a surrogacy agreement whereby Mr.
Stern’s sperm was implanted into
the surrogate.33 The Stern family
opted to use the surrogate’s eggs
due to Mrs. Stern’s fertility issues, although no court or legal
commentary has expounded upon
what those fertility issues were.34
Up until the child was born, the
process had been successful for
the Sterns.35 Then, the surrogate,
Mary Beth Whitehead, decided
that she wanted to keep the child
and the Sterns sued for parental
rights.36 The New Jersey Supreme Court was left to decide
who the child’s parents were as
the state legislature provided no
statutory guidance on the mat-
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ter.37 The court invalidated the surrogacy contract between the Sterns
and the surrogate based on public
policy implications that it felt
stemmed from such agreements.38
The court reasoned that surrogacy
agreements exploited lower income
individuals, who would be inclined
to use their bodies for money.39
Ultimately, the court used the best
interests of the child analysis to
determine placement of the child.40
It reasoned that placing the child
with the Sterns was the best outcome for the child.41 The court did
find the surrogate to be the child’s
legal mother, and thus, Mrs. Stern
could not adopt Melissa until she
became an adult.42
While protection from exploitation of lower income individuals was a guiding public policy
concern for the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M, this is not
the only theory that has been offered in response to the legal issues
surrounding surrogacy. There is
also the feminist approach, which
advocates for the enforceability of
surrogacy contracts, under the view
that a woman should have autonomy of her body and its reproductive capabilities.43
A California court appeared
to adopt a more feminist approach,
considering the freedom to contract
in its analysis of a surrogacy agreement in Johnson v. Calvert.44 In
this case, the Calverts, seeking to
start a family, used the gestational
method of surrogacy. The court
used an intent-based analysis.46 It
reasoned that but-for the Calverts,
who had the intent to bring the

child into the world, the child
would not exist and, therefore,
they were the child’s legal parents.47
This case is clearly factually different than In Re Baby M,
where the Sterns used the traditional method of surrogacy.45 The
facts in Johnson v. Calvert probably made it more palatable for the
court to find the Calverts to be the
child’s legal parents as they had a
genetic link. But the court was
unequivocal in regards to the parties’ freedom to contract when it
stated, “[T]he parties voluntarily
agreed to participate in in vitro
fertilization and related medical
procedures before the child was
conceived; at the time when Anna
[the surrogate] entered into the
contract, therefore, she was not
vulnerable to financial inducements to part with her own expected offspring.”48 This part of
the court’s analysis was less paternalistic than the approach the
New Jersey Supreme took in Baby M, and thus, exemplified another policy that could shape a
court’s decision in a surrogacy
case.
Another case that is illustrative of how a court may decide
when presented with a surrogacy
agreement gone awry is Belsito v.
Clark. In this case, the Clarks
sought to start a family via the
gestational surrogacy method.49
The court did not use the intentbased test of Johnson v. Calvert
but instead looked to the genetic
link of the parents to the child.50
The Ohio court limited the legal

parents in a surrogacy agreement
to those with a genetic link to the
child.51 Although the court’s decision made surrogacy contracts
more predictable at the outset, it is
important to note that it also expanded the amount of individuals
that could not be deemed to be the
legal parents of a child resulting
from gestational surrogacy arrangements.
Current Statutory Regulation
A few states and the federal district of Washington, D.C.
have banned surrogacy agreements.52 In Washington, D.C. all
surrogacy contracts are unenforceable and the entrance into such
agreements may result in prison
confinement, fines, or potentially
both.53 New York has also banned
all surrogacy agreements.54 In the
state of New York, the heaviest
penalties are for those who act as
intermediaries, which could be
anyone who tries to facilitate a
surrogacy contract.55 Michigan
also bans surrogacy agreements;
its statutory scheme closely resembles New York’s approach.56
Finally, Nebraska and Indiana
have also statutorily banned surrogacy contracts.57
While statutory regulation
of surrogacy is the exception rather than the norm in the United
States, a few states have attempted
to provide guidance to those seeking to start a family via surrogacy.
Florida allows for gestational
agreements but requires that the
intending parents must be mar-
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ried.58 Several other states such
as Virginia, Texas, and Nevada
have similar statutory frameworks to Florida regarding gestational agreements.59 Finally,
Illinois has some of the most
comprehensive legislation regarding gestational surrogacy
agreements.60
Illinois enacted its Gestational Surrogacy Act (GSA) to
standardize various aspects of a
gestational surrogacy agreement.61 Under the GSA, intending parents will be deemed the
legal parents of the child resultREGULATION IN THE
FORM OF ELIGIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS MAY
HAVE PREVENTED A
HEART-BREAKING
CASE OF A GESTATIONAL ARRANGEMENT
GONE AWRY.
ing from a gestational surrogacy
arrangement when certain requirements have been met.62
First, those seeking to a start a
family through this method of
surrogacy must be doing so out
of medical necessity.63 The GSA
also requires that at least one
intending parent supply reproductive cells to be implanted in
the surrogate.64 There has been
some criticism of Illinois’s approach, which provides guidance
for only intending parents who
can supply gametes.65 It is understandable that some individuals feel this is unfair, as the in-

tending parents who use only donor
gametes are not protected by Illinois’s GSA.
Another feature of the GSA
is Illinois’s attempt to protect the
surrogate via certain eligibility requirements:
A gestational surrogate shall
be deemed to have satisfied
the requirements of this Act
if she has met the following
requirements at the time the
gestational surrogacy contract is executed:
(1) she is at least 21 years of
age;
(2) she has given birth to at
least one child;
(3) she has completed a medical evaluation;
(4) she has completed a mental health evaluation66
A surrogate must be, at a minimum,
21 years of age. The statute also requires that the surrogate have previously bore a child and mandates
mental and physical health evaluations.67 These regulations aim to ensure that the woman choosing to become a gestational surrogate is mentally fit to be one.68
Regulation in the form of eligibility requirements may have prevented a heart-breaking case of a
gestational arrangement gone awry.
Crystal Kelley, a 29-year old woman, agreed to be the gestational surrogate for a Connecticut couple.69
Everything was going according to
plan until about half way through the
pregnancy.70
In February 2012, an ultra-

sound revealed that the baby that
Ms. Kelley was carrying had
severe deformities including a
brain cyst, heart abnormality,
and cleft palate.71 The baby
would require numerous surgeries and constant medical treatment.72 This medical treatment
would be immensely expensive.73 Furthermore, the surrogacy agreement that Ms. Kelley
and the couple entered into had a
specific clause, which stated that
Ms. Kelley was to abort the baby
in the event of a “severe fetus
abnormality.”74
The Connecticut couple
desperately wanted Ms. Kelley
to have an abortion.75 They even
offered her an extra $10,000 dollars to abort the baby.76 Ms. Kelley presented a counter-offer of
$15,000 dollars but the couple
would not pay it.77 Ultimately,
Ms. Kelley claimed she would
not have an abortion for religious reasons.78
While Connecticut has
case law that may be instructive to parties entering into surrogacy arrangements, the legislature has not produced anything comprehensive regarding
such arrangements.79 Mandating eligibility requirements,
such as a mental health evaluation of the surrogate, may have
revealed Ms. Kelley’s antiabortion beliefs. Such information may have made the
Connecticut couple reconsider
entering into an agreement
with a woman whose religious
beliefs were in opposition to
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the abortion provision in the surrogacy contract.
The legal process between
Ms. Kelley and the Connecticut
couple became increasingly more
painful and complex for the parties
as each day passed.80 Under Connecticut case law, the intending
parents privy to the surrogacy
agreement are the lawful parents
of the child resulting from the arrangement.81 When it became clear
that Ms. Kelley would not have an
abortion, the couple decided that
right after the baby’s birth, they
would give the baby to the state.82
Upon learning this, Ms. Kelley
decided to flee to Michigan, where
the state laws deemed her to be the
legal mother of the baby.83 She
bore a baby girl who is now
known as Baby S.84 Ms. Kelley
knew that financial factors would
prevent her from keeping the baby.85 She gave Baby S up for
adoption to another couple.86 Since
being born, Baby S has undergone
serious surgeries on her heart and
her intestines, with more major
surgeries to come in the future.87
Conclusion
As discussed previously,
SART has concluded that gestational surrogacy is the more prevalent type of surrogacy.88 The
Council of Responsible Genetics
has concluded that the method of
gestational surrogacy has seen rapid growth and has predicted that
this trend is not likely to slow
down.89 Since the trend demon-

strates rapid growth in the utilization
of gestational surrogacy, pragmatism
would suggest that state legislatures
should begin to thoroughly regulate
this method of surrogacy. From a
humanistic standpoint, those seeking
to start a family utilizing surrogacy
likely have infertility issues or an alternative family unit and have endured emotional hardships as a result.
Comprehensive statutory regulation
that aims to guide and protect both
the intending parents and the gestational surrogate will prevent such
families from experiencing more
emotional hardships such as being
dragged through years of litigation to
assume parental rights over a child.
While the recommendation is
that only gestational surrogacy be
regulated by state legislatures, a ban
on traditional surrogacy would have
serious implications where both partners are infertile and cannot afford
gestational surrogacy but wish to
start a family. When such arrangements do not work out, the court system is best apt to deal with the challenges presented by such scenarios.
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The Social Responsibility of Federally Funded Health Care for
Undocumented Immigrants
emergency treatment regardless
Anthony W. Liberatore
Anthony.liberatore@student.shu.edu of ability to pay and immigration
status.9 This is how Luis Jimenez
was able to receive emergency
Introduction
medical care at the Martin MeIn the winter of 2000 an un- morial Medical Center in Florida
documented Guatemalan migrant after his accident. However,
laborer named Luis Jimenez was once a patient is stabilized, the
struck by a Florida drunk driver and federal government ceases to pay
suffered traumatic brain damage, for ongoing medical care in both
among other serious injuries, that hospitals and rehabilitation and
would forever change his life.1 nursing facilities.10 There is disDoctors at the Martin Memorial pute over whether the requireMedical Center, where Jimenez was ment in the Emergency Medical
taken after the accident, treated him Treatment and Labor Act
until June 2000, when he was trans- (“EMTALA”), which requires
ferred to a nursing home.2 In Janu- hospitals to stabilize patients beary 2001, Jimenez was readmitted to fore releasing or transferring
the hospital for emergency treat- them, continues to apply after the
ment.3 Because he was unable to patient has been admitted to the
pay for his medical care, which to- hospital.11 What is clear, howevtaled more than $1.5 million, a court er, is that many private and even
granted an order allowing the Martin public hospitals have begun to
Memorial Medical Center to forci- forcibly and coercively deport
bly return Jimenez to his native undocumented immigrant paGuatemala.4 The order was issued tients to their native countries
over the objections of Jimenez and when they are unable to pay for
provided medical care.12 Luis
his court appointed guardian.5
Today, Luis Jimenez, who is Jimenez is just one example of
now 37, cannot walk and has the countless individuals who have
mental age of a young child.6 He is been adversely affected by this
cared for by his elderly mother in practice.13 Other patients are
Guatemala. In the summer of 2008 deemed stabilized and released
New York Times reporter Deborah from the hospital without the
Sontag visited Jimenez and found prospect of continuing medical
him largely confined to his bed suf- care.
The emergency medical
fering from routine seizures.7 He
had not received medical care for care mandated by EMTALA is
the only federally funded public
over five years.8
Hospitals in the United health care available to undocuStates that receive federal Medicare mented immigrants in the United
funding are required to provide States.14 Because federal funds

may not be used to provide nonemergency health care to undocumented immigrants, those who
are in this country illegally are
ineligible to receive federally
funded public health insurance
programs, including Medicaid,
Medicare, and the Child Health
Insurance Program (CHIP).15
Had Luis Jimenez had access to
some form of sustained public
health care after his accident, it
is possible that he would not be
largely confined to his bed suffering from routine seizures today. Luis Jimenez’s case clearly demonstrates that EMTALA’s provisions alone are insufficient to adequately care for the
medical needs of the vulnerable
undocumented immigrant population.16 As a nation that purports to respect the life and dignity of all people, we must do
more to provide access to medical care for everyone within our
borders, even those here unlawfully.
Providing Health Care to Undocumented Immigrants is
Our Social Responsibility
We have a social responsibility to provide for the medical needs of all those within our
borders. This includes undocumented, or illegal, immigrants.
Regardless of where a person
came from, how they arrived in
the United States, how long they
have been here, or what legal
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status they hold, every person
within the borders of the United
States should have access to medical care. For vulnerable populations such as undocumented immigrants such access cannot exist
without the ability to receive federally funded public health insurance benefits, for example, from
Medicaid, Medicare, or CHIP.
It has long been undisputed
that undocumented immigrants are
highly susceptible to receiving uncompensated medical care.17 Poor
living and harsh working conditions, as well as the lack of sufficient income to pay for health insurance or medical care, are paramount reasons why undocumented
immigrants often rely on EMTALA as their only option to seek
medical care in hospital emergency rooms.18 A lack of preventative
and early intervention care has developed among this population as
a result.19 Moreover, seriously ill
and injured undocumented immigrants often must make the difficult choice of staying in the United
States where they are unable to
receive necessary medical treatment, or leaving their family behind and return to their native
country in order to receive medical
care. This, of course, is conditioned on them having not already
been forcibly medically repatriated
by the treating hospital here in the
United States.20 Access to health
care and federally funded health
insurance programs for the immigrant population at large, and in
particular the undocumented immigrant population, is an im-

portant issue for everyone in the
United States. Such access will
limit the amount of uncompensated medical care provided, will
increase the overall health of our
population, and will foster our
nation’s commitment to equality
and fairness for every person
within our borders.
The long-term health and
societal benefits that stem from
increased access to health care,
including preventative and early
intervention care, expound our
social responsibility to provide
EVEN IF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS DO NOT HAVE
ANY COGNIZABLE LEGAL RIGHT TO GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED
HEALTH BENEFITS, THEY
SHOULD NEVERTHELESS
BE PROVIDED WITH
THOSE BENEFITS. IT
SIMPLY IS THE RIGHT
THING TO DO.
federally funded health care to
undocumented immigrants. First,
the entire population benefits
from providing the health care to
an at-risk and vulnerable population. Undocumented immigrants
“live, work, and attend school in
communities throughout the country; laws and bureaucratic barriers
that reduce their use of key preventative health services, such as
immunizations and screenings for
infectious disease, make for bad
public health policy…” reports

Susan Okie, a volunteer physician at a primary care clinic in
Maryland that cares for uninsured immigrants from Latin
America and West Africa.21 In
addition to increasing access to
quality care and decreasing costs
of quality care for everyone in
the system, extending coverage
to undocumented immigrants
“would also have carry-over
benefits in the realm of public
health, as it would begin to act as
a preventative regime rather than
allowing the progression of illness to more advanced points.”22
For a population that has lower
frequencies of doctor’s visits and
lower utilization of health care
services, access to health care
and health care coverage can
help prevent disease, including
epidemic and contagious conditions, thereby safeguarding the
overall public health.23 Finally,
lack of health care among this
vulnerable population could potentially lead to drug-resistant or
more virulent strains of disease
that would pose a risk to everyone, not just undocumented immigrants.24
Second, the wholesale
denial of health care and federal
health insurance access to a class
of people is both discriminatory
and dehumanizing. Access to
health care is a human right that
cannot be ignored. The 1948
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) guarantees a
right to life and to health.25 Article 25 of the UDHR states that
“[e]veryone has the right to a
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standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including…medical care and necessary social services.”26 The
United States, as a signatory to
the UDHR, is legally bound by
its provisions and must endeavor
to protect the human rights, including guarantee of life and
health, to all peoples within its
borders. The ethical debate
about providing health care to
undocumented immigrants has
been transformed into a political
debate. However, we must not
deprive a whole population of
people access to health care
merely because they entered the
United States illegally.27 It is
simply untenable to deny any
individual access to health care
because they broke a law, particularly when we have an affirmative duty under the UDHR to
guarantee all persons’ right to
health.
Third,
undocumented
immigrants contribute to our society in very meaningful ways.
In fact, it can be argued that the
services they provide are invaluable. Illegal immigrants are our
neighbors and co-workers, members of our church congregations, and, for many of us, good
friends. They are hard workers,
good parents, and productive
members of our communities.
They are no different than those
who happened to be born here.
However, many undocumented
immigrants are willing to per-

form unglamorous jobs, such as
washing dishes in a restaurant or
working as a farm hand, which
many Americans do not want.28
While many argue that illegal immigration negatively impacts our
economy, in fact “[i]llegal immigration…tend[s] to provide the
U.S. economy with workers who
are in scarce supply.”29 According to Giovanni Peri, an economist at the University of California, Davis, undocumented workers do not compete with skilled
laborers, but rather they comple-

ment them.30 Peri found that “[i]n
states with more undocumented
immigrants…skilled
workers
made more money and worked
more hours; the economy’s
productivity grew. From 1990 to
2007, undocumented workers increased legal workers’ pay in
complementary jobs by up to 10
percent.”31 Providing undocumented immigrants with health
care and coverage under federally

funded health care programs will
not only benefit the undocumented immigrants, but will provide
long-term societal and health
benefits.
While the benefits to
providing undocumented immigrants with access to health care
coverage under federally funded
health care programs are overwhelming, there are some arguments that challenge this view.
For example, it has been argued
that permitting undocumented
immigrants to gain access to
health care and, more particularly, federally funded health care
programs, will impose additional
burdens on an already overwhelmed U.S. health care system, including hospitals. It has
also been argued that a burden
would be placed on taxpayers
and the federal budget to fund
any expansion of benefits to undocumented immigrants. While
these arguments have been advanced, securing the life and dignity of all peoples within our
country mandates that we provide undocumented immigrants
with access to health care, as
well as coverage under federally
funded health care programs.
Securing the health and safety of
every person within our borders
is worth the minor additional
burden that could be placed on
our health care systems or our
taxpayers (some of whom are
undocumented workers).
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the
DREAM Act Fail to Provide Solutions
The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“PPACA” or
“ACA”),32 fails to provide undocumented immigrants access to federal funding for health care. The
Act’s individual mandate provision does not cover undocumented
immigrants.33 Moreover, government subsidies and other benefits
associated with the reform are similarly unavailable.34 The individual
mandate requirement of the
PPACA defines “applicable mandate” to exclude “an individual for
any month if for the month the individual is not a citizen or national
of the United States or an alien
lawfully present in the United
States.”35
In June 2012 President
Obama announced that undocumented immigrants who came to
the United States as children, attended school here or served in the
U.S. Armed Forces, and met certain other requirements would be
permitted to remain in the country
without fear of deportation.36 Instituted by executive action, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) program, or the miniDream Act, permits young undocumented immigrants to obtain
work authorization.37 The DACA
program does not, however, make
young immigrants eligible for
health insurance coverage under
the PPACA.38 Moreover, the
Obama administration has de-

clared that young immigrants
granted relief “shall not be eligible” for Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program.39
Despite widespread agreement among the American people
that the United States must reform
the largely expensive and dysfunctional health care and immigration systems, there is passionate disagreement about what reform measures are necessary. At
the intersection of this collision
are the more than 11 million undocumented immigrants currently

living in the United States. If access to health care and federally
funded health programs for all
undocumented immigrants is too
much to ask for, those granted
relief under the DACA program,
commonly referred to as Dreamers, are exactly the type of subgroup that should be targeted.
Young people who came to the
United States at a very young age,
often brought by their parents, are
here to stay. They are socially
and culturally engrained into our
society and they are an important
part of our future.
Despite the comprehensive exclusion of undocumented

immigrants from provisions of
the recently upheld health care
reform legislation and the
DACA program, undocumented
immigrants, particularly young
immigrants, should be entitled to
federally funded health care.
Even if illegal immigrants do not
have any cognizable legal right
to government-provided health
benefits, they should nevertheless be provided with those benefits. It simply is the right thing
to do. An overwhelming body of
evidence shows a direct correlation between lack of insurance,
lack of health care, and poor
health among Americans.40 For
example, “[t]he long-term uninsured face a 25 percent greater
likelihood of premature death
than do insured Americans, and
uninsured Americans with breast
or colorectal cancer are 30 to 50
percent more likely to die prematurely. An estimated 22,000
Americans die every year because they are uninsured.”41
This evidence of the importance
of health insurance is likely more
troubling when considered in the
context of undocumented immigrants, who generally have no
access to health insurance.
San Francisco’s Healthy San
Francisco Program is a Workable Model
In July 2006 the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors
adopted the Health Care Security
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Ordinance, which created the
Healthy San Francisco (“HSF”)
program.42 While not health insurance, Healthy San Francisco
provides access to affordable
health care services for uninsured residents of the city regardless of immigration status.43
HSF provides “access to basic
and ongoing medical services,
including primary and specialty
care, inpatient care, diagnostic
services, mental health services,
and prescription drugs” at twenty-nine participating clinics and
five local hospitals.44
Enrollees in the HFS
program pay quarterly participant fees based on income,
while employers must spend a
minimum amount per hour on
health care for their employees.45 Medium and large employers with over 50 workers are
required to participate.46 Small
employers (i.e., businesses with
less than 50 workers) and nonprofit organizations are exempt.47 Employers must contribute between $1.17 and $1.76
per hour per covered worker,
who include all workers employed for at least 90 days and
who work a minimum of ten
hours per week.48 Those employers subject to the HFS program “can satisfy these requirements in a number of ways, including by directly paying for
health care services or purchasing health insurance on behalf of
their employees, by funding
health savings accounts, or by

contributing to the city option.”49
Although highly controversial, the HFS program’s employer funding requirement was
upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals against challenges
that it violated the Employee Re-

tirement and Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), which prohibits state or local governments
from regulating employee benefit
plans, including health insurance
plans.50 The court found that employers could be legally forced to
either provide health benefits to
its workers or pay into the city
fund for providing health benefits
to the uninsured.51 The U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari, effectively ending legal
challenges against the program.52
William H. Dow, a senior
economist for President George
W. Bush’s Council of Economic
Advisors and a professor of
health economics at the University of California, Berkeley, reported in 2009 that “[t]oday, almost
all residents in the city have affordable access to comprehensive
health care delivery systems...”53
Moreover, he revealed that “[a]s
of December 2008, there was no
indication that San Francisco’s

employment grew more slowly
after the enactment of the employer-spending
requirement
than did employment in surrounding areas in San Mateo or
Alameda counties. If anything,
employment trends were slightly
better in San Francisco.”54 What
is most telling about the HFS
program’s potential is that it has
“demonstrated that requiring a
shared-responsibility model—in
which employers pay to help
achieve universal coverage—has
not led to the substantial job losses many feared. The public option has also passed the market
test, while not crowding out private options.”55
The tens of thousands of
uninsured San Franciscans that
have enrolled in the HFS program certainly pales in comparison to the roughly 11 million undocumented immigrants living in
the United States. This is to say
that the Healthy San Francisco
program is not a perfect solution
for providing all undocumented
immigrants with access to health
care and health care coverage.
The HFS program is not even a
perfect solution for providing
Dreamers with health care coverage. But, the HFS program represents a workable model. At the
end of fiscal year 2011-2012,
concluding its fifth year in operation, the HFS program had
46,822 participants and had provided access to care to over
116,000 uninsured adult residents.56 The program’s office
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visit rate per year, at three visits,
was the same as the national Medicaid average, while avoidable
emergency department utilization
was lower than California’s MediCal average.57 HSF’s readmission
rate, moreover, was below the national average of 18%.58 This is a
model for access to affordable
health care for uninsured undocumented immigrants that if implemented carefully could work at a
national level. The Dreamers are
the perfect group on whom to test
the model’s applicability and success. This is a model that should
apply now to Dreamers, and if
successful, eventually to all undocumented immigrants.
Conclusion
Providing undocumented
immigrants with health care beyond the emergency care already
provided under EMTALA is crucial. We have a social responsibility to provide for the medical
needs of all those within our borders, including undocumented immigrants. Access to health care
and federally funded health insurance programs for the immigrant
population at large, and in particular the undocumented immigrant
population, is important to the
overall population of the United
States, as such access will help
limit the amount of uncompensated medical care provided, will
increase the overall health of our
population, and will foster our nation’s commitment to equality and
fairness for every person within

our borders. Enrolling Dreamers
in a program modeled after
Healthy San Francisco is a sensible and workable beginning, but
we must strive to ensure that
eventually all undocumented immigrants within the United States
have unhindered access to quality
health care. This can only occur
if undocumented immigrants are
granted access to the federally
funded health care programs.
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Pharmaceuticals, Crime, and the Constitution: Promoting Off-Label
Drug Use and the First Amendment
Phillip DeFedele
phillip.defedele@gmail.com
The Decision
When
pharmaceutical
companies and their representatives promote off-label uses for
the drugs they produce, criminal
charges for violating the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”) will almost inevitably
follow. In most, if not all, of
these cases, conversations with
physicians and others regarding
off-label indications constituted
promotion of an off-label use. It
was therefore surprising when
the Second Circuit vacated the
conviction of a pharmaceutical
sales representative who verbally conveyed to a physician offlabel uses of the FDA-approved
drug Xyrem in United States v.
Caronia (“Caronia”).1 The defendant was originally found
guilty of conspiring to introduce
a misbranded drug into interstate
commerce in violation of 21
U.S.C. §331(a).2 His conviction
was founded on the oral promotion of Xyrem to a physician in
order to cause him to prescribe
the drug for off-label indications.3 Following sentencing, the
defendant argued on appeal that
the conviction violated his First
Amendment right to free
speech.4
On appeal, the government argued that it did not prosecute defendant for his speech

per se, but rather used it as evidence to demonstrate that the promoted off-label uses of Xyrem
were intended usages of the drug,
which were not provided for in its
instructions.5 The Circuit Court
rejected the government’s argument and held that the defendant
was prosecuted for his promotion
and marketing efforts and, thereby, his speech.6 The court then
held that the prosecution was impermissible under applicable First
Amendment doctrines, and that
the government could not prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers or their representatives for
“speech promoting the lawful, off
-label use of an FDA-approved
drug.”7 However, the court did
not find the applicable FDCA
provisions unconstitutional.
Although this case ultimately turned upon issues of constitutional law, it has clear and
severe collateral impacts upon
health and pharmaceutical law.
To appreciate the significance of
the ruling, an in-depth look into
the FDCA and Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) regulations concerning off-label drug
promotion is warranted.
Acts and Regulations
The government prosecuted the defendant under 21 U.S.C.
§331(a) of the FDCA which prohibits the “introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce of any food, drug, de-

vice, tobacco product, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.”8 Pursuant to the
FDCA, a drug is misbranded if it
does not bear “adequate directions for use,” meaning instructions under which a “layman”
can use a drug safely and for its
intended uses.9 At first glance, it
would appear that oral off-label
promotion of a drug would not
violate this provision of the
FDCA because it concerns misbranding; however, this issue
ultimately depends upon the
manifestation of the drug’s intended uses.
Under FDA regulations, a
drug’s intended uses refer to the
objective intent of those legally
responsible for the labeling of
drugs, such as pharmaceutical
companies.10 This objective intent is determined by their expressions, such as oral statements
by their representatives including
off-label promotion.11 Thus, offlabel promotional statements
may serve as evidence of a
drug’s intended use that has not
yet been approved by the FDA.12
This would effectively make the
drug misbranded under 28
U.S.C. § 331(a) because the
drug’s labeling would not provide adequate instructions for the
off-label intended use.13 Therefore, although the FDCA does
not expressly prohibit off-label
marketing, the government may
prosecute pharmaceutical representatives who do so.14 The Sec-
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ond Circuit in Caronia viewed this
as the government construing the
FDCA to “prohibit promotional
speech as misbranding itself.”15
Those
guilty
of
“misbranding” are subject to criminal prosecution and may face imprisonment for up to three years, a
fine of $10,000, or both.16 However, it is important to note that these
provisions of the FDCA and the
FDA regulations apply solely to
those responsible for a drug’s labeling and its representatives. The
FDCA does not inhibit a physician’s ability to prescribe drugs for
uses, patient populations, or treatment regimens not approved by
the FDA.17 In fact, it is often argued that such off-label uses may
be the most appropriate form of
drug therapy in certain situations

and, as the Supreme Court stated,
are “an accepted and necessary
corollary of the FDA’s mission to
regulate in this area without directly interfering with the practice of
medicine.”18 Therefore, the FDCA
and FDA do not consider off-label
drug use in itself unlawful, but rather criminalize the promotion of
non-indicated uses. The holding in
Caronia effectively challenges this

long held “tradition” of prosecution for off-label promotion.
Aftermath and the Policy War
Although the decision in
Caronia may be viewed as having
a limited holding, its consequences are nothing short of extraordinary. The government has repeatedly and successfully prosecuted
pharmaceutical companies and
their representatives for misbranding through off-label promotion.19
Convicted companies face both
civil and criminal liability for discussing or influencing physicians
to prescribe their products for offlabel indications, and have paid
billions of dollars to date in civil
and criminal penalties for doing
so.20 In the aftermath of Caronia,
this trend should come to a halt, at
least within the Second Circuit.
As long as the companies and
their representatives are truthfully
promoting the off-label uses of
drugs, they cannot be criminally
liable for that conduct. However,
widespread adoption of this interpretation is contingent upon a future Supreme Court ruling, should
the issue ever reach the Supreme
Court. Until then, Circuit Court
judges who face similar issues as
those presented in Caronia will
have to look at it as persuasive
authority and consider the underlying policy issues.
The Caronia decision has
been on the front lines of the ongoing policy war concerning the
issue of off-label promotion. The

court itself was split and the
majority and dissenting opinions took into account the policy concerns on both sides of the
issue. The majority justifies its
position by citing the importance of free flowing medical information, efficiency, and
the protection of freedom of
speech. The dissent, on the other hand, values upholding precedent, safety, and ensuring the
integrity of the FDA approval
process above all else. Both
sides have compelling policy
arguments in support of their
positions on this difficult question, which may eventually play
a deciding role in resolving this
issue once and for all.
The majority embraces
the potential benefits that may
result from its decision such as
the free flow of medically relevant and potentially lifesaving
information. The majority argues that prohibiting off-label
promotion but permitting offlabel use by physicians unreasonably interferes with both
doctors’ and patients’ ability to
receive treatment information.21
Furthermore, the restriction of off-label promotion
may be a detriment to the public by inhibiting “informed and
intelligent
treatment
decisions.”22 The majority strongly
believes that “in the fields of
medicine and public health,
where information can save
lives, it only furthers the public
interest to ensure that decisions
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about the use of prescription
drugs, including off-label usage,
are intelligent and wellinformed.”23 Although the majority does acknowledge certain
fora where off-label information
is conveyed to the medical profession, such as scientific journals and continuing medical education programs, it still views
the prosecution of off-label promotion as prohibiting free flowing information that can inform
treatment decisions. 24
The majority views pharmaceutical companies and their
representatives as being in an
informed position readily capable of advising the public and
health professionals about the
benefits associated with the offlabel uses of their products. In
fact, the majority presented various alternatives to the current

FDA regime without resorting to
First Amendment restrictions,
such as the government counseling physicians and patients in
distinguishing between misleading promotion and truthful statements.25 The majority’s position
reemphasizes the belief that,“[i]f
the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating

speech must be a last, not first,
resort.”26 It was this principle that
the majority most wanted to further and that played the pivotal
role in shaping its decision.
The dissent would rather
uphold the status quo to ensure
pharmaceutical companies comply with FDA regulations. The
dissent holds fast to the precedent
that the “First Amendment does
not prohibit the evidentiary use of
speech to establish the elements
of a crime to prove motive or intent,” and views the defendant’s
speech as just that.27 Furthermore, the dissent argues that the
majority’s approach departs from
the Circuit’s precedent that promotion of a certain use demonstrates an intent that the drug be
used for that purpose.28 While
courts are permitted to overrule
their own precedent, the dissent
clearly feels that doing so will
result in harmful standards of industry compliance with FDA regulations and the FDCA.
A touchstone of the
FDCA is the premarket approval
process that all drugs must go
through prior to being sold. Although the Caronia decision applies to drugs that have already
gone through this process, it still
bears severe consequences for the
future of the approval scheme.
The dissent argues that since drug
companies can now promote
FDA-approved drugs for off-label
indications they no longer have
any incentives to seek approval
for those indications.29 The prohibition of off-label promotion has

been instrumental in compelling
drug developers to further participate in the approval process when
expanding a drug’s industry recognized uses, which ensures as
well as improves the drug’s safety and efficacy.30 Essentially, by
permitting off-label promotion
for FDA-approved drugs, pharmaceutical companies do not
need to seek approval for any
subsequent uses. This would subject the public to a plethora of
potentially dangerous uses that
would not be subject to the
FDA’s approval process.
To illustrate this point, the
drug Xyrem in Caronia was approved by the FDA for different
indications on two occasions. It
was first approved in July 2002
for the treatment of narcolepsy
patients experiencing cataplexy.31
It was then approved for an additional use in November 2005 to
treat narcolepsy patients with excessive
daytime
sleepiness
32
(“EDS”). Pursuant to the dissent’s theory, once approved in
2002, Xyrem’s manufacturer
could promote its uses for narcolepsy patients with EDS without
obtaining FDA approval and
without fear of prosecution.
Therefore, there would be no
need for the manufacturer to obtain further approval leaving open
the possibility for the promotion
of a dangerous indication without
limitations.
The dissent is also concerned that Caronia will undercut
the legitimacy of the process for
new drugs seeking FDA approv-
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al. The FDCA requires a balancing
of a drug’s benefits and risks when
determining whether a drug should
be approved.33 Typically, the FDA
Commissioner considers a drug
safe when the therapeutic gain justifies the drug’s risk.34 However,
according to the dissent, if a manufacturer can distribute a drug “for
any use so long as it is approved
for one use” the balancing of risks
and benefits becomes extremely
difficult or impossible.35 This is
because a drug “viewed as safe for
certain uses might be considered
unsafe overall if the benefits and
risks being weighed are not for a
specific intended use but rather for
any use at all.”36 This means that a
manufacturer of a new drug may
front the safest intended use during the approval process and then
promote any other uses afterwards
without having to reapply and risk
disapproval. Therefore, drugs that
would fail the process because the
total benefits do not outweigh the
total risks would be approved and
made available to the public.
The Road Ahead
It is important to remember
that the holding in Caronia is limited to the Second Circuit and is at
best persuasive authority in other
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the
court did not rule any provision of
the FDCA or its accompanying
regulations unconstitutional; it only held the manner in which the
prosecution proceeded was unconstitutional. Moreover, the holding

only applies to truthful statements
regarding lawful off-label use.
Any promotion that is misleading
or false is not protected under the
First Amendment doctrines used
in Caronia. It may therefore be
tempting for compliance firms
counseling clients within the Second Circuit to no longer warn
against off-label promotion so
long as it is truthful, nonmisleading, and for lawful offlabel indications. Although Caronia condones this type of promotion, with the FDCA and its regulations still in full force this may
continue to be a risky course of
action.
THE FDCA REQUIRES A
BALANCING OF A DRUG’S
BENEFITS AND RISKS
WHEN DETERMINING
WHETHER A DRUG
SHOULD BE APPROVED.
However, it is equally important to remember the various
policy implications that result
from this decision and the benefits
and drawbacks that come with
them. As the majority and dissent
make evident, there are various
reasons for permitting off-label
promotion and an equal amount
for prohibiting it. Unless other
jurisdictions follow the precedent
set out in Caronia, there will be a
jurisdictional split on this issue
until the Supreme Court has the
final say in the matter. Unfortunately, the Department of Justice

will not appeal the decision to
the Supreme Court presumably
fearing that it might affirm the
Caronia decision making it
binding throughout the United
States. Therefore, the resolution
of this issue is currently in limbo
and uncertain to say the least. It
is likely that other jurisdictions
will continue to follow their
precedents and prosecute those
who promote off-label indications. However, there is always
a chance that Caronia may find
its way into an appellate brief
and persuade the circuit judges
otherwise. All that is certain is
that this will remain a heavily
debated and contested issue due
to the involvement of the interests of the public welfare, freedom of speech, the FDA, and an
entire industry.
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Physician Assistants in the Era of Health Reform
Nina Schuman
nina.schuman@gmail.com
As the United States
health care system continues to
evolve, especially with the passage and upholding of the Affordable Care Act, several shifts
have occurred in the provision
of care.1 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) released a report describing the
impact of the Affordable Care
Act on health insurance coverage.2 With Medicaid expansion
and the mandates, health insurance will extend to an additional
34 million people in the United
States by 2019.3 To address the
rise in newly insured individuals’ need for medical care, President Obama has called for an
immediate expansion of primary
care providers including: primary care physicians, nurses and
physician
assistants.4
Even
though U.S. medical schools are
expanding to account for this
increased need for primary care
doctors, the number of residency
positions is not increasing.5
Therefore, these changes necessitate greater autonomy to other
primary care providers, namely,
physician assistants.6
A study recently published in the Annals of Family
Medicine predicted the number
of primary care physicians that
will be needed through 2025 after the passage of the Affordable
Care Act.7 Utilizing various
sources of data— like the Medi-

cal Expenditure Panel Survey,
demographic data from the US
Census Bureau, and American
Medical Association’s Master
File—to forecast use of primary
care services, the study indicated
that the total number of primary
care office visits would increase
from 462 million in 2008 to 565
million in 2025.8 The main factors contributing to this surge are
population growth and aging.9 By
2025, there will be a need for
roughly 52,000 additional primary care physicians in the United
States.10 Insurance expansion accounts for 8,000 additional physicians while aging and population
growth contributes 10,000 and
33,000 additional physicians, respectively.11

Medicare has historically
provided direct and indirect financial support to hospitals for
residency programs for doctors.12
Since 1983, Medicare has reduced its indirect funding to hospitals for residency programs numerous times, yet the number of
residents has increased by nearly

25%.13 As a result of these funding cuts, some hospitals have
shifted resources from primarycare training to specialty programs that generate greater revenue for the hospital, such as cardiothoracic surgery.14 This has
caused a 20% reduction in the
number of primary care physicians.15
With the simultaneous
predicted increase in demand and
reduction in supply of primary
care physicians other forms of
primary care providers will be
crucial, namely, physician assistants (“PAs”).16 The Bureau of
Labor Statistics projects a 30%
increase in employment of PAs
from 2010 to 2020, which is rapid compared to the average
growth for all other occupations.17 This demand is especially
high in rural areas since more
doctors are choosing to specialize and practice in urban areas.18
According to the American Academy of Physician Assistants (AAPA), a PA is “a medical professional who works as
part of a team with a doctor.”19
PAs undergo educational training
similar to that of condensed medical school training.20 Applicants
for PA programs are required to
have completed basic science
requirements during their undergraduate studies.21 The majority
of PA programs award a Master’s degree after completion of
2,000 hours of clinical rotation in
addition to medical science classes.22 PAs have an extensive
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range of responsibilities including:
executing physical examinations
and procedures, treating and diagnosing illnesses, ordering and interpreting laboratory tests, assisting in surgeries, providing education for patients, counseling, and
making rounds in hospitals and
nursing homes.23 While PA practice is a “team model approach” in
which physicians supervise PAs,
supervising physicians are not required to be present and direct
each phase of PA-provided care.
However, there are states with
some exceptions during the early
stages of a PA’s career.24
Furthermore, PAs are allowed to prescribe medication
with the supervision of a physician.25 With controlled medications, however, the ability of PAs
to prescribe varies with state law.26
Federal and state laws regulate
controlled
medications,
or
“scheduled drugs,” because of
their potential for dependence and
abuse.27 For example, Kentucky
and Florida do not authorize PAs
to prescribe controlled substances.28
Initially, state laws limited
the number of PAs that were to be
supervised by a single physician.29
The ratio was generally 2:1 but
most of these ratios have been
modified.30 As PA practice progressed and became more recognized, the need for specific ratio
laws lessened because medical
practice has embraced these providers as team members.31 In
1998, the American Medical Asso-

ciation determined that the proper
ratio of physician-to-physician
extenders should be left to the discretion of supervising physicians
at the practice level and consistent
with state law, if applicable.32 The
American College of Physicians
alongside the AAPA also adopted
the belief that ratio levels should
be established at the practice level.33 In 2012, Delaware increased
the number of PAs that one physician could supervise from two to
four; Illinois from two to five
(with ratios abolished in hospitals,
hospital affiliates, and ambulatory
surgical centers); Iowa from two
to five; and Virginia, from two to
six.34
Since
Massachusetts
passed its comprehensive health
reform to provide universal health
insurance coverage, the state continues to be progressive in the
health sector. Governor Deval
Patrick signed a bill on August 6,
2012 intended to improve the
quality of health care and reduce
costs through transparency, efficiency, and innovation.35 With
roughly $200 billion in expected
savings over a 15-year period, this
legislation marks the next phase
of health care reform.36 Within
this law, important changes have
expanded the role of PAs.37 Specifically, health plans must recognize PAs as a primary care provider.38 The PAs will continue to
work as a team with the doctors,
but they will largely be independently responsible for their
patients.39 Because of the demand

for physician assistants, Tufts
University School of Medicine
and Boston University School of
Medicine have launched physician assistant programs.40
In contrast, a recent Wall
Street Journal report indicated
that PAs in Kentucky are struggling to expand their responsibilities.41 Currently, the law necessitates physician supervision for
the first 18 months after certification.42 During this time, a supervising physician must be on
site—phone interaction will not
suffice.43 This law greatly inhibits practices in rural areas where
the amount of primary care physicians relative to patients is
low.44 A physician in rural Kentucky, Dr. Naren James, explained this struggle in the WSJ
Report.45 As a doctor covering
two clinics that are 25 miles
apart, it becomes problematic
when the patient volume reaches
levels of 25,000 annually and
only two of his four PAs can
treat without on-site supervision.46 The two other PAs that
work with him are less than 18
months on the job, so his on-site
supervision is required.47 The
only other state with this type of
strict requirements is Colorado,
but supervision is only mandated
for the first 1,000 hours after certification.48
The delivery of primary
care has indeed changed since
the medical profession has accepted physician assistants as
part of the overall medical team.
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As states provide greater autonomy to PAs, more efficient allocation of resources will be utilized. This greater autonomy
will surely assist doctors with
the overwhelming amount of
new patients that will be covered
under the Affordable Care Act.

SETON HALL HEALTH LAW OUTLOOK

VOLUME VI, ISSUE 2

PAGE 26

Reproductive Ramifications: The U.S. Refusal to Ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women and the Damaging Collateral Consequences on the Right
to Choose
Elijah Bresley
Elibresley@gmail.com
Among the scant handful of countries that have not
ratified the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women
(the Convention) are Iran, Sudan, Somalia, and strangely
enough the United States of
America.1 President Carter
signed the Convention in 1980
and thirty years later the U.S.
still has not ratified it. Among
other obligations, Article 16(1)
(e) of the Convention requires
countries to provide women
with the right to choose whether
to have children.2 This is interpreted to further include reproductive rights.3 A woman’s
right to choose an abortion has a
contentious and complicated
history in the U.S., with much
of the debate focused on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Constitution. This article
takes the position that the U.S.’s
reliance on Constitutional interpretation explains the failure to
ratify the treaty, as well as the
potential of the treaty to help
protect women’s reproductive
rights in the U.S. Because the
Convention is a stronger articulation of a woman’s right to
choose an abortion, ratification
of the Convention would help

protect women’s rights in a way
that would supplement the Constitution’s vague standard.
Before beginning a dis-

cussion about women’s reproductive rights, the argument that this
article makes needs to be justified constitutionally.4 If the Convention were signed by the President and ratified by two thirds of
the Senate the treaty would have
been ratified correctly under Article II of the constitution.5 This is
a different power than that of
Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Article II has been
interpreted by the courts to allow
boarder range of legislation to
Congress than the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 The seminal case
on this issue is Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) where
a treaty was judged to be part of
the supreme law of the land and
to preempt state law despite
Tenth Amendment concerns

where no other constitutional
provisions prevented federal action. Similarly, Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1957) takes
the position that the treaty power
is unlimited except by the Constitution. Consequently, as long
as the subject matter of the treaty
is not in conflict with the Constitution, the treaty is valid law.
Taken together these cases show
that the federal government has a
large amount of leeway to legislate through its treaty powers
that it does not have through the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is also of note that even when Congress enacts law even in an area
where state legislation would
otherwise be valid, the federal
law (including treaties) preempts
the state legislation.7
Unfortunately, the discussion about the exact effects of
the treaty is not the most important debate because the Convention is not self-executing.
This means that just because the
Convention is ratified, and becomes part of the law of the
land, it will not have any enforcement mechanisms or means
of implementation. It will be a
backdrop and standard to live up
to more than a piece of legislation that is implemented and enforced in an day-to-day context.
As this article discusses below, it
will have an effect as a standard
even if it does not supply a cause
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of action in and of itself. The
Convention would ultimately be
in a similar situation to that at
issue in Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491 (2008) where the Supreme Court said that while a
treaty was an international
agreement under which the U.S.
had obligations, without an enforcement provision, it was not
binding on states and enforceable there. In the same way the
Convention would be a standard
to shape and develop U.S. laws
without creating new causes of
action.
Abortion and a woman’s
right to choose is a very political
issue in the U.S. Many of the
defining moments in the
longstanding debate have been
Supreme Court decisions setting
out the constitutional standard.8
The two camps (“pro-life” and
the “pro-choice”) are especially
divisive between political parties
and religious groups. As a result,
this issue features prominently
in political campaigns and debates.9 In an article arguing for
U.S. ratification of the Convention, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, an
Associate Professor of Law at
the University of Pennsylvania,
discusses the effects of religious
groups’ efforts to counter women’s rights in the U.S.10 Mayer
also notes that Democrats are
more in favor of ratification than
Republicans.11 This demonstrates the split in American politics on the issues and how the
political parties differ over the
treaty. Democrats are more like-

rights,” and the interpretation of
the right by CEDAW firmly encloses that option.
Harold Hongju Koh, a
Legal Advisor to the Department
of State, supports ratification of
the Convention. However, he
takes the position that the ConTHE IMPLEMENTATION OF vention does not create a right
for women to choose an aborAN INTERNATIONAL
tion.16 He defends his position by
STANDARD [FOR WOMEN’S
arguing that the Convention is
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM] neutral on abortion (just discussWOULD ALLOW FOR THESE ing family planning matters) and
RIGHTS TO BE RECOGby pointing to several countries
NIZED AND CONSIDERED
that are signatories to the treaty
MORE CAREFULLY IN THE that have banned abortion.17 Regardless of other countries’ posiFUTURE LEGISLATION
tions, Koh’s interpretation cuts
same rights to decide freely and against the apparent meaning of
responsibly on the number and the treaty and CEDAW’s interspacing of their children and to pretation. Abortion is a “means”
have access to the information, of enabling women to choose the
education and means to enable number and timing of their chilthem to exercise these rights.”12 dren. While it is true that aborThe article implies, but not ex- tion is not specifically named as
plicitly grants the right to choose a means that should be enforced,
an abortion. In 1994, the Com- it is reasonably within the scope
mittee on the Elimination of Dis- of the term. The plain and ordicrimination
against
Women nary meaning of the words used
(CEDAW) concluded that under in the Convention fairly describe
Article 16(1)(e) women should this type of “means” to choose.
have the right to decide whether Consequently, Koh’s argument is
to have children or not.13 It also helpful in trying to persuade
states that while this decision can Americans to support ratification
be made with consultation of a of the Convention, but its concluspouse or a partner, ultimately sion is contrary to the Conventhis is the woman’s decision to tion itself.
One of the reasons that
make.14 Abortion is plainly a
method that a woman could use the U.S. has not ratified the Conto determine the number and vention is because there were
spacing of her children.15 Conse- people in Congress who believed
quently an abortion is a “means that all of the rights enumerated
to enable them to exercise these in the Convention are previously
ly to be in favor of the right to
choose an abortion as well as ratification of the Convention, while
Republicans are less likely to be
in favor of either.
Article 16(1)(e) of the
Convention grants women “[t]he
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guaranteed by the Constitution.18 The fact that the Convention goes beyond the Constitution and guarantees more rights
to women was a difficult issue
for certain lawmakers during
the ratification process.19 While
it may be the case that there is
significant overlap, the Convention provides a clearer standard
and when it is added to the legal
landscape, it can only support
and uphold women’s rights.
Constitutionally, finding and
enforcing women’s rights begins by interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment (though Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) is
an exception because it turned
on an implied right to privacy).20 This requires judicial interpretation every time that a
new right is asserted. A list of
enumerated rights would be
clearer and more manageable
because it would be a part of the
framework of US laws and
would help bolster the case for
women’s reproductive rights. A
problem arises however, because this decision is not made
free from existing precedent.
The U.S. has a long history of
looking for guidance to the
Constitution on many new issues that afflicts the country,
such as issues of gun control,
taxation, and the right to vote
for women and AfricanAmericans. Since abortion is
such a complex and personal
issue in the U.S. it makes sense

that the U.S. would not ratify a
treaty that had the slightest possibility of adding weight to either
side of this spirited and partisan
debate.21
The reluctance of the U.S.
to ratify the Convention despite
the benefits that it offers to women’s rights demonstrates the importance of the Convention and
its potential advantages as a

backdrop for the protection of
reproductive rights for women.
The set of standards would be
more effective to protecting
women’s rights because the
rights would be enumerated, and
they could better woven into the
fabric of American society instead of being imposed arbitrarily
from a vague standard in the
Constitution. This is preferable to
a system where no set of enumerated rights for women exist, and
they can only be enforced after a
case is made and proven in court.
In the case of the right of women
to choose abortions, the Convention is a preferable starting point

for these rights because it is a
clearer standard, and does not
rely on murky and potentially
inconsistent interpretations of the
Constitution.
The Convention would
have a discernible and positive
effect on reproductive rights in
the U.S., but there are proponents of the Convention who argue that it will have only a limited effect if ratified. The best
example of this mixed message
is Koh. He encourages ratification and adoption of the Convention to provide protections that
his ancestral family has in Korea
but which are still unavailable in
the U.S.22 Nevertheless, he simultaneously asserts that the Convention will not alter state or domestic laws in any significant
way.23 It seems odd to argue that
the Convention is necessary because of the protections that it
affords, but at the same time existing laws render it essentially
irrelevant.
There are other backers
of the Convention that ignore its
potential effects in the U.S. A
significant one is Melanne
Verveer, the Ambassador-atlarge for Global Women’s Issues. She advised the U.S. to ratify the Convention for American
appearances abroad, but makes
no mention of the treaty’s effects
domestically.24 Another organization in favor of ratification,
GlobalSolutions.org, maintains
that the Convention will not supersede domestic laws, that the
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Convention has no enforcement
mechanism, and therefore is no
threat to U.S. law.25 The Convention’s perceived futility hardly seem like grounds for encouraging ratification. Even though
all support ratification of the
Convention, these authors focus
on the fact that the Convention
will not change existing laws in
order to increase its appeal.
Despite these assertions
to the contrary, the Convention
is important and should be ratified in the U.S. because it will
have a positive effect on the facilitation of women’s reproductive freedom. The U.S. does not
have Constitutional mandates
that explicitly ensure that women’s rights are upheld or even
that equality between the sexes is
enforced.26 The implementation
of an international standard
would allow for these rights to
be recognized and considered
more carefully in the future legislation. There must be some
benefits that are worth obtaining
as a result of ratification given
the difficulties of compliance. In
this case, there is more than just
the global image boost that the
U.S. would receive by joining
most of the world as signatories.
A clear standard of women’s reproductive rights would be given
a voice, and its application
would improve the legalistic and
partisan debate on abortion in the
U.S. Because the Convention
makes women’s rights so much
clearer than the Constitution, it is
a preferable standard, especially

in regards to reproductive rights
issues.
Unlike the U.S., the United
Kingdom (the “UK”) is an example of a country that does not face
Constitutional issues regarding the
legality of abortions. The UK does
not have a written constitution that
needs to be referred to in an attempt to ensure that new legislation conforms to an antiquated vision for the country. Parliament
passed The Abortion Act of
1967,27 which effectively legalized
abortion before the country signed
the Convention in 1981, and then
ratified it in 1986.28 (The UK has a
reservation to Article 16, but it applies to (f), and not (e) which is at
issue in this article.)29 The fact that
the UK was able to do this without
excessive litigation illustrates the
difference between the British and
American approaches to the issue.
It is of note that the majority of
people in the UK support a woman’s right to choose an abortion
and think that the government
should not interfere.30 This shows
that the UK has a majority of public support for the right to choose
an abortion, in addition to having
legislation in place and the Convention to help enforce that right.
Without the complex and
dividing Constitutional issues that
hampers change in the U.S., the
UK was able to ratify a major treaty that promotes equality and helps
to enforce women’s reproductive
rights. Like the UK, the U.S. had
previously legalized abortion, but
it was through litigation and not
the legislature. In the U.S., both

the partisan nature of the debate
and the powerful role of the
courts have made ratification of
the Convention almost impossible. This helps to demonstrate
that the written and controversial
Constitution of the U.S. is what
is standing in the way of the ratification of a clearer and stronger
standard for women’s rights.
Abortion remains a major
issue in the U.S. that has significant political and Constitutional
consequences. Due to the clarity
it would provide as to women’s
reproductive rights and the implied right to an abortion enumerated within, the U.S. should
ratify the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. This
is a pertinent example of an issue
where the ratification of a human
rights treaty would have a significant benefit to women’s reproductive rights in the U.S.
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Playing Doctor: How the FDA’s Regulation of Access to
Experimental Drugs Limits Patient Autonomy
Benjamin Smith
benjoelsmith@gmail.com
By the time more than
1,000 members of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (“ACT
UP”) surrounded the FDA’s headquarters on the morning of October 11, 1988, more than 62,000
Americans had already died of
HIV/AIDS.1 The epidemic, though
only a few years old, was claiming
thousands of lives a month and
new diagnoses were increasing
exponentially.2 The members of
ACT UP had gathered outside of
the FDA’s suburban Maryland
headquarters to demand immediate
agency action to stem the flood of
AIDS-related illness and death.3

The conceptual thread
connecting the demands made of
the FDA that day was expanding
access to experimental drug therapy and treatment for the seriously
or terminally ill.4 Although the
FDA had implemented a new avenue for access5 the year before the
demonstration, those actually suffering from terminal illness had
not experienced any significant
relief.6 The demonstrators demanded that the FDA shorten the
drug approval process for the seriously or terminally ill by allowing
access to experimental drugs as
early as the beginning of Phase 2
trials.7 Citing ethical concerns,
ACT UP also called for the end of
double-blind placebo trials, in
which some subjects receive a
placebo instead of a new treatment or study drug.8 While ACT
UP’s demands were not immediately met by the FDA9, their protests raised the profile of terminally-ill patients and the groups that
advocate for them.10
The ACT UP demonstration, and the FDA’s response to
the HIV/AIDS crisis, illustrates a
critical shortcoming in modern
American healthcare. The desperation of the protestors, who were
driven to forcibly occupy the
headquarters of an entity created
to protect them, was a result of
the FDA’s utter failure to adapt to
the needs of terminally ill patients.11 Today, a quarter of a century after the ACT UP demonstrations, individuals with serious or

terminal illnesses face similar
challenges. Ironically, while
ACT UP was protesting FDA
inaction, today the primary obstacle to accessing experimental
treatment is a recent FDA action.12
In the context of regulating access to experimental drugs,
the FDA is tasked with assessing
the safety and efficacy of proposed new drugs.13 The FDA has
attempted to satisfy this mandate
by creating a multi-phase clinical
trial process, and strictly limiting
access to the drug while it is being assessed.14 Patients who satisfy the rigorous statutory requirements for entry into a trial
may access a drug in Phase 2
testing.15 However, those who
are seriously or terminally ill
typically cannot meet these requirements.16 For over 25 years,
terminal patients had to wait until testing was completed, a process that averages 12 years.17
Since 1987, the FDA has made
multiple attempts to expand access to experimental drugs for
the seriously or terminally ill,
with little success.18 The most
recent incarnation of this parade
of half-measures came in 2009,
when the FDA promulgated a
new set of regulations to replace
the 1987 rules.19 The new rules
attempted to expand access to
those disqualified from clinical
trials by allowing access when
the patient’s treating physician
has determined that several treat-
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ment criteria have been met.20
The fundamental flaw in the new
regulations—specifically section
312.305—is that they require the
FDA to do a “risk-benefit” analysis of the physician’s decision
before releasing the drug.21
While the FDA’s recent
attempt to expand access to experimental drug treatment for
the seriously and terminally ill is
laudable, it not only falls short
of achieving its objective, it
oversteps its statutory authority.
The FDA is tasked with assessing the safety and efficacy of
proposed drugs before they are
released to the public, not with
assessing the private, intimate
discussions and decisions made
between a patient and their physician.
Congressional Action and the
FDA’s Response
In drafting the Food and
Drug Amendment and Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA),
Congress explicitly set out to
establish a route of access for
the individual patient excluded
from the clinical trial process.22
Specifically, Section 360bbb
states that individual patients
seeking treatment outside clinical trials and “acting through a
physician...may request from a
manufacturer or distributor...an
investigational drug or investigational device,” subject to certain conditions.23 Functionally,
§360bbb makes no mention of
FDA supervision or input out-

side of determining whether the
proposed new treatment has been
shown to be at least minimally
safe and effective.24 Under the
new framework, the decision to
seek an experimental treatment is
one for the patient and their physician alone, with the FDA merely
deciding whether initial clinical
trials have established some level
of safety and efficacy.
THE ACT UP DEMONSTRATION, AND THE FDA’S RESPONSE TO THE HIV/AIDS
CRISIS, ILLUSTRATES A
CRITICAL SHORTCOMING
IN MODERN AMERICAN
HEALTHCARE.
In response to growing
criticism over the discrepancy between the promise of expanded
access under the §360bbb framework and the actual functioning of
expanded access programs,25 the
FDA created new rules for its experimental drugs access scheme.26
The final rules, promulgated in
2009, established three population
categories eligible for expanded
access: 1) individual patients
(including emergency requests,
formerly
known
as
“compassionate” or “emergency
use” requests), 2) intermediatesized patient groups, and 3) general access (also known as a treatment protocol).27 Further, the new
regulations established a baseline
criteria for expanded access, stating that the FDA must determine:
1) that “the patient or patients to

be treated have a serious or immediately life-threatening disease
or condition, and there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative
therapy to diagnose, monitor, or
treat the disease or condition;” 2)
“[t]he potential patient benefit
justifies the potential risks of the
treatment use and those potential
risks are not unreasonable in the
context of the disease or condition to be treated;” and 3) “[p]
roviding the investigational drug
for the requested use will not interfere with the initiation, conduct, or completion of clinical
investigations that could support
marketing approval of the expanded access use or otherwise
compromise the potential development of the expanded access
use.”28 Under the 2009 rules, the
FDA evaluates the operative criteria on a sliding scale, which in
some cases could provide access
to drugs based on as little as early
Phase 1 safety data.29
In promulgating the new
rules, the FDA intended to clarify
existing procedure, create new
categories of expanded access,
and “improve access to investigational drugs for patients with serious
or
immediately
lifethreatening diseases or conditions
who lack other therapeutic options and who may benefit from
such therapies.”30 In an attempt to
balance the agency’s mandate to
foster research and development
while also protecting potential
consumers, the FDA sought to
“appropriately authoriz[e] access
to promising drugs while protect-
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ing patient safety and avoiding
interference with the development
of investigational drugs.”31 To further this effort at balancing the
competing interests involved in the
expanded access context, the FDA
also promulgated new regulations
to allow drug sponsors to recover
the cost of expanded access to investigational drugs.32 Specifically,
drug sponsors can recover the direct costs of making the investigational drug available, which are
typically limited to the costs of
manufacturing and shipping the
drugs as well as monitoring the
treatment protocol.33 Finally, in
yet another attempt to balance the
interests of patients, physicians,
and pharmaceutical manufacturers,
the new rules required that doctors
overseeing patients with access to
investigational drugs outside of
clinical trials report both positive
and adverse outcomes to the
FDA.34 Beyond ensuring that each
instance of expanded access does
not interfere with a sponsor’s clinical testing of the proposed new
drug, this measure seems to facilitate an expanded access program
actually making a contribution to
the FDA's evaluation of a drug.
Taken together, Congress’
creation of a pathway to access—
by passing §360bbb of the FDAMA—and the FDA’s subsequent
promulgation of the 2009 rules are
a significant development for terminally-ill patients. However,
while these measures seem to offer
an increased opportunity for patient autonomy and decision-

making, a single provision in the
FDA’s new rules stands as both
an unprecedented expansion of
the agency’s authority as well as a
significant obstacle to expanded
access. Section 312.305 of the
2009 regulations, which authorizes the FDA to assess the
“reasonableness” of a patient’s
decision to take an experimental
drug,35 threatens to undermine the
promise of expanded access created by §360bbb. Without corrective action, this single provision
could prevent seriously or terminally ill patients from accessing
the experimental treatments Congress intended to authorize in the
FDAMA.
SINCE 1987, THE FDA
HAS MADE MULTIPLE
ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND
ACCESS TO EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS FOR
THE SERIOUSLY OR
TERMINALLY ILL,
WITH LITTLE SUCCESS.
What the FDA’s 2009 Regulations Got Right, What They Got
Wrong, and What Can Be Done
About It
Although the FDA purportedly promulgated its 2009
regulations in an effort to expand
access to experimental drugs, they
ultimately only served to reinforce the agency’s existing practice. Further, by interposing a distant, outside regulator36 into a de-

cision-making process that
should be both deeply personal
and
individualized,37
the
FDA’s regulations exceeded
the agency’s statutory authority. In an attempt to both critique the agency’s action and
offer potential solutions, it
would be helpful to divide the
analysis and look first to the
statutory and practical problems created by the new rules,
then offer potential solutions
for an expanded access
scheme that seeks to address
the concerns of patients, the
industry, and the FDA.
In promulgating the
2009
rules—specifically
§312.305(a)(2), which delegates to the FDA the riskbenefit analysis determining
whether a patient should receive
an
experimental
drug38—the FDA has exceeded the statutory mandate of the
FDAMA.39
In
passing
§360bbb of the FDAMA, Congress delegated a very limited
power to the FDA, only intending it to play its traditional
role of reviewing clinical data
to inform physician prescription
practices.40
Section
360bbb does not at any point
refer to individual patient riskbenefit analysis and only authorizes an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence
of safety and efficacy.41 This
clearly functions as a reinforcement of the spirit of the
1962 Amendments and in no
way expands the FDA’s au-
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thority beyond that point. In
§312.305(a)(2), however, the
FDA has created a far more invasive role for itself by stating
that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) has both
the discretion and the authority—not to mention the scientific
and medical expertise—to assess
potential patient benefits and
risks and ultimately decide what
is “best” for that patient.42 Even
assuming that an outside regulatory body could—without firsthand knowledge of a patient’s
condition—actually have a better understanding of that patient’s immediate medical needs
than their own doctor, Congress
explicitly prohibited such agency action in the FDAMA.43 Section 360bbb explicitly reserved
the type of risk-benefit analysis
at issue here for the physician
and their patient.44
In promulgating §312.305
(a)(2), the FDA not only interposed itself into a situation it
does not have the authority to
encroach upon, it dramatically
rewrote the fundamental role of
the FDA.45 The FDA—in one of
its central operating manuals—
defined its role in the clinical
trial context as one of reviewing
information submitted by drug
sponsors, aggregating and interpreting this data, and offering
this information as a foundation
for prescribing physician treatment
decisions.46
Section
360bbb(b)(1) of the FDAMA
seems to reinforce this conclusion by giving physicians the

authority to weigh and assess the
relevant factors of an individual’s
case in deciding treatment, while
the FDA has the authority to ensure that there is a sufficient evidential foundation supporting the
decision.47 Simply ensuring that
there is enough evidence to support a physician’s decision is a
very different proposition than
attempting to ensure that the physician has made the right decision.
This type of institutionalized second-guessing of clinical
treatment decisions has never
been a part of the FDA’s mandate,
and
Congress—in
passing
§360bbb and creating separate
duties for physicians and the
FDA48—seems to have gone out
of its way to reinforce this idea.
Further, the Supreme Court has
held that an agency, absent explicit authorization from Congress, should not assume “a responsibility that runs counter to
its previously delegated powers
and responsibilities.”49 In promulgating §312.305(a)(2), the FDA
has both violated the Brown doctrine by assuming a new role that
runs counter to previous duties,50
and overstepped the authority delegated by §360bbb of the FDAMA, which merely serves to reinforce the FDA’s previous practice
of assessing safety and efficacy.
As long as patients are making
reasoned and informed decisions
in consultation with their physician, the FDA should limit itself
to assessing the adequacy and veracity of the data on safety and
efficacy, and not on the substance

of the patient’s treatment decision.
Historically, the FDA has
only been one of many obstacles
to expanded access. Perhaps the
principal limiting factor has been
drug manufacturers’ unwillingness to shoulder the costs of participating in expanded access programs.51 Potentially increased liability due to adverse reactions and
decreased participation in clinical
trials make expanded access economically unattractive.52 In the
past this had been compounded
with FDA-mandated limitations
on cost-recovery.53 Although the
FDA has amended the previous
regulations to allow drug sponsors to recover the cost of expanded access,54 this new cost
recovery is limited to the direct
costs of making the investigational drug available, which are usually limited to the costs of manufacturing and shipping the drug,
as well as monitoring the treatment protocol.55 Balancing the
risks and costs of participation for
pharmaceutical manufacturers is
an essential aspect of a successful
expanded access scheme.
The FDA’s recent decision to rule out recovery for the
costs of research and development will presumably decrease
industry incentive to participate in
expanded access programs.56 At
the very least, allowing a drug
sponsor to provide their product
at or near market value would
make participation in an expanded access program slightly more
attractive. If the industry was al-

VOLUME VI, ISSUE 2

PAGE 34

‘Playing Doctor’
lowed to recoup some of the cost
of research and development—
especially when a drug is still in
the testing phase and not bringing
in any revenue—not only would
the incentive to participate increase, the incentive to introduce
new treatments for less lucrative
illnesses would also increase. Especially in the context of drugs
targeted towards diseases that afflict a relatively small populationbase, recovery at or near market
value for expanded access would
function as an incentive for developing new drugs for those illnesses. This does raise the specter of
dubious sponsors proposing dubious drugs, but §360bbb’s safety
provisions provide a solid framework for vetting treatments introduced under this new costrecovery scheme. Increased costrecovery also raises issues of payment and insurance-coverage; increased recovery for industry will
mean increased cost for insurance
providers. While this is a significant concern, it is one that many
other industrialized nations have
effectively addressed.57 Even if a
physician and patient have to negotiate or fight for insurance precertification and coverage for an
experimental treatment, such inconveniences would be an improvement over the status quo.
Without industry participation in
developing experimental treatments, patients will not have the
opportunity to request insurance
coverage.
Similarly, in an attempt to

strike a balance between expanding access, providing incentives to
industry, and maintaining its responsibility for monitoring the
development of new drugs, the
FDA’s new regulations require
that physicians overseeing the use
of investigational drugs outside of
clinical trials report all outcomes,
both positive and adverse.58 This
IN PROMULGATING
§312.305(A)(2), THE FDA
NOT ONLY INTERPOSED
ITSELF INTO A SITUATION IT DOES NOT HAVE
THE AUTHORITY TO ENCROACH UPON, IT DRAMATICALLY REWROTE
THE FUNDAMENTAL
ROLE OF THE FDA.
is a clear example of the FDA’s
2009 regulations getting something right. The pharmaceutical
industry has—since the beginning
of expanded access—voiced a
concern that allowing participation outside of trials will stifle the
process. They argue that patients
who can access a drug outside of
clinical trials, thus avoiding potentially receiving a control group
placebo, will do so. As access expands, trial participation will
shrink. The FDA’s newest provision ensures that each instance of
expanded access does not interfere with clinical testing, and actually provides drug sponsors
with another source of data that
could be reported to the FDA. In
essence, the industry is receiving

a supplementary source of outcome data that the FDA will accept and include in its final NDA
analysis. These two measures,
allowing cost recovery at or near
market value and mandated outcome reporting used to bolster
existing clinical trial data, should
alleviate some of the pharmaceutical industry’s economic concerns over an expanded access
program.
With expanded access,
especially access outside the
controlled environment of clinical trials, an increase in tort
claims arising from adverse reactions seems unavoidable. As
more and more patients get access to drugs that have not fully
completed
“safety”
and
“effectiveness” testing, instances
of negative outcomes will likely
rise. Industry concern over increasing liability has not been
addressed by the FDA in the
past, and the 2009 regulations
are no different. Although regulations prohibit asking a participant to waive any future tort or
negligence claims,59 there are
effective tools for mitigating liability. An increased focus on the
importance and practical effectiveness of informed consent
would be productive here. While
many patients will not want to
risk the chance of adverse effects
from experimental treatment,
many will,60 and it is difficult to
justify respecting the preferences
of one class of patients and not
the other. Although there are
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concerns over decision-making
capacity, studies have shown
that patients in the late stages of
an illness still make reasoned
and informed decisions.61 Informed consent provides a
framework in which these preference-based decisions can be
made and respected while also
providing the drug manufacturer
with some level of liability protection.62 If the expanded access
patient has made an informed
and reasoned decision, based on
initial clinical data from the
sponsor and guidance from her
physician, industry liability
should be minimal. As long as
the manufacturer follows the
guidelines set out in the IND and
NDA, responsibility for the patient’s decision should rest with
the patient. This raises a final
concern created by the 2009 regulations.
Section 312.60 mandates
an intricate informed consent
protocol that, while satisfactorily
addressing many of the industry
concerns
discussed
above,
makes the prescribing physician
responsible for any patient decisions made under the influence
of her medical judgment.63 Failure to follow these strict rules
may result in loss of investigator
privileges64 and, because these
rules could ultimately inform
standards of care, open the practitioner up to medical malpractice claims.65 By requiring a prescribing physician to be as
knowledgeable about the experimental drug and its attendant

usage protocols as its sponsor,66
as well as potentially liable if the
treatment is for any reason contraindicated for that patient, the
FDA’s 2009 regulations establish
a significant burden of care for
the physician. And while this new
standard of care makes the secondary FDA analysis required by
§312.305 both redundant and
cumbersome,67 it also presumably
reduces physician participation
rates.
A significant liability burden is placed on the prescribing
physician when they must know
as much about the drug as its
sponsor, and the risk of increased
negligence claims resulting from
expanded access will most likely
drive down physician participation. However, a slight rewording
of §312.60 should alleviate the
concerns of prescribing physicians. While the 2009 regulations
shifted the informed consent burden from the sponsor to the physician, which is entirely appropriate
in the expanded access context,
they failed to elucidate a clear and
coherent standard of care. Rather
than let a court determine what
the standard of care is by assessing the intent of the regulation’s punitive measures,68 the
FDA should have created an explicit standard for a physician prescribing an experimental drug. In
the medical malpractice context
generally, most states use the
“what would a reasonable physician in a similar situation have
done” standard, which essentially
looks to the common medical

practice appropriate for that scenario.69 Similarly, a re-drafting of
§312.60 which explicitly establishes a “common practice” protocol for the expanded access physician would alleviate concerns
over increased liability. The FDA
should re-draft the regulation—
with input from physicians who
regularly prescribe and administer
experimental treatments—in such
a way that any potential prescriber has no doubt as to what his or
her obligations are. A clear and
explicit standard of care for the
prescription and administration of
experimental treatments would
not only protect the patients who
might receive the drug, it would
offer a substantial liability shield
for the prescribing physician.
While the risk of adverse
effects for patients and the economic burdens for manufacturers
are very real and play a significant role here, arguably the greatest obstacle to expanded access
created by the FDA’s 2009 regulations is §312.305(a)(2). Whatever improvements the new rules
engendered are negligible compared to the enormous setback
§312.305(a)(2) constitutes. Its
severe and unprecedented restriction on patient autonomy effectively eliminates choice in a
scenario where choosing between
treatments truly is a life or death
proposition. Therefore, changing
§312.305(a)(2) is essential to expanding access to experimental
drugs.
Although the FDA has
explicitly and repeatedly rejected
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calls for a re-wording of §312.305
(a)(2),70 this would seem to be the
simplest and most direct route to
rectifying the FDA’s overstep.
Congress could amend the
FDCA71 to directly address the
issue, including language specifically separating the analysis done
by physicians and the analysis
done by the FDA. Congressional
action of this sort would make
§312.305(a)(2) immediately invalid and subject to litigation if the
FDA does not alter it. Patients or
WITH EXPANDED ACCESS,
ESPECIALLY ACCESS
OUTSIDE THE CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT
OF CLINICAL TRIALS, AN
INCREASE IN TORT
CLAIMS ARISING FROM
ADVERSE REACTIONS
SEEMS UNAVOIDABLE.
patient’s rights groups could also
challenge the regulation on the
grounds that it exceeds the statutory delegation of authority provided
by §360bbb of the FDAMA, therefore constituting an agency overreach of the type seen in Brown.72
While litigation could
force the FDA’s hand, and Congressional action could clarify
misconceptions and cement the
parallel but separate functions of
physicians and the FDA, both of
these options are expensive and
time-consuming. The simplest,
most efficient, and most direct
form of change in this circum-

stance would be remedial action
by the FDA itself. In crafting the
provisions outlining the physician’s responsibilities under the
new framework, the FDA imported the exact language from the
FDAMA.73 It would be difficult to
argue that simply importing the
FDAMA’s language on the separate function of the FDA in this
context would be untenable. In
promulgating §312.305(a)(2), the
FDA overstepped the authority
granted it by Congress, and a simple re-wording of that subsection
would radically alter the new regulations’ impact on the seriously
and terminally ill. A revised subsection, echoing the mandate of
§360bbb, would firmly place a
deeply personal and life-altering
decision in the hands of the individuals most qualified to make
it—the patient and their physician.

PAGE 37

SETON HALL HEALTH LAW OUTLOOK

Anti-Aging Cosmetics: The Thin Line Between Advertising Puffery
and FDA Enforcement
Suzan Y. Sanal
Suzan.yasemin@gmail.com
“[B]oosts the activity of genes
and stimulates the production of
youth proteins”
-Génifique Youth Activating
Concentrate
“Pro-Xylane™, a patented scientific innovation-- has been
shown to improve the condition
around the stem cells and stimulate cell regeneration to reconstruct skin to a denser quality.”
-Absolue Precious Cells Advanced Regenerating and Reconstructing Cream SPF 15
Sunscreen

public health through its regulation of food, drugs, and cosmetics,
deemed
these
claims
“intended to affect the structure or
any function of the human
body.”4 This intent moved these
cosmetics to the drug category
under section 201(g)(1)(C) of the
Food Drug and Cosmetics Act
(“FDCA”). L’Oreal had two options: submit their cosmetics to
the rigorous New Drug Approval
(“NDA”) process or discontinue
making such claims.
Under the FDCA, cosmetics are only permitted to make

“[U]nique R.A.R.E. oligopeptide
helps to re-bundle collagen.”
-Rénergie Microlift Eye
R.A.R.E.™ Intense Repositioning Eye Lifter
In September of 2012,
Lancôme became the object of
an uncommon and undesired
form of attention for a cosmetics
company. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) issued a
Warning Letter1 against L’Oreal,
Lancôme’s parent company and
the world’s largest cosmetics
maker,2 citing the above claims
gathered online from their expensive Genifique, Absolue, and
Renergie skincare lines (priced
between $60 to $350 an item for
amounts of up to 1.7oz).3 The
agency, charged with promoting

superficial claims of enhancing
beauty or aesthetics. Treatment
claims or claims with reference to
affecting physiological structure
or function of the body (i.e. structure/function claims) place products in the drug category, which
mandates submitting products to
an NDA that takes “on average 12
years and over $350 million.”5 An
NDA would require a showing of

not only safety, but also efficacy.
For decades now, however, cosmetic companies have been
walking a thin line with antiaging products. Products purporting to physically turn back the
hands of time without the intervention of surgery are very appealing to American consumers.
In fact, in 2011 alone, the U.S.
anti-aging market was assessed at
$2.9 billion.6 However, such
claims of permanently reducing
fine lines and wrinkles or tightening the skin, all consequences of
aging, come across as suspiciously similar to drug structure/
function claims. And with drug
claims, there are concerns of effectiveness.
While cosmetic companies might not detail the biological mechanisms contained in their
products that imply to promote a
youthful appearance, they make
efforts to create the impression
that their products are backed-up
by science and have been clinically tested to be effective. In fact,
on their retail website, Lancôme
stated that their “Absolue L’Extrait” anti-aging product, which
contains “2 million Lancôme
Rose native cells,” had been clinically studied on 41 women.7
Brand names such as “Perricone
MD” and “Dermadoctor” along
with the growing use of the term
“cosmeceutical,” a term not formally recognized by the FDCA8,
can lead consumers to believe
that there is scientific evidence to
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back-up anti-aging claims and
permanent drug-like benefits derived from these products.
Courts, too, have struggled
with anti-aging cosmetic claims.
In Sudden Change, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted a face cream product’s
claims advertising to provide a
“Face Lift Without Surgery.”9
The trial court found that the
product only created temporary
change in appearance and the Second Circuit found a “vulnerable
consumer” might reasonably believe that references to “face lift”
and “surgery” would indeed
“affect the structure of the
body.”10 It determined that the
reasonable consumer may react
with skepticism to such claims
and find them to be “advertising
puffery,”11 but “the ignorant, the
unthinking, and the credulous”12
cannot be expected to understand
that such unfamiliar claims might
be an exaggeration. In order to
best protect the consuming public,
the court reasoned that cosmetic
companies do not deserve immunity for “advertising puffery,” thus,
Sudden Change had to discontinue making their facelift claim.
Since Sudden Change,
however, the FDA has opted to
send regulatory Warning Letters
instead of pursuing cosmetic companies in court.13 This has left the
cosmetics industry to be basically
self-regulated through competition. The FDA generally takes a
hands-off approach, further, due
to industry concerns about safe-

guarding trade secrets and patented and trademarked processes. The agency does not explicitly approve cosmetics as with
drugs, since resources are limited, but instead operates as a
reactionary to cosmetic company
claims.
SINCE SUDDEN CHANGE,
HOWEVER, FDA HAS OPTED TO SEND REGULATORY WARNING LETTERS INSTEAD OF PURSUING COSMETIC COMPANIES IN
COURT.
It appears though that the
FDA is beginning to rev-up their
reactionary activities. In October of 2012, the FDA sent a
Warning Letter to Avon because
of claims made in regards to
their Anew product line.14 The
letter cited the claims such as
“The at-home answer to wrinkle
filling injections...Start rebuilding collagen in just 48 hours;”
“[W]rinkles are a result of micro
-injuries to the skin, so AVON
studied how skin heals…
ANEW’s Activinol Technology
helps reactivate skin’s repair
process to recreate fresh skin &
help dramatically reverse visible
wrinkles;” and “In just 3 days,
see tighter, firmer, more lifted
skin.” As with Lancôme’s products, the FDA concluded that
these products “are not generally
recognized among qualified experts as safe and effective for the
above referenced uses.”
Recipients of Warning

Letters are given 15 working
days from receipt of the letters
to correct the violations and failure to comply could result in
enforcement action and potential
seizure of the products. Legal
teams are forced to scramble. In
November 2012, the FDA published a “Close Out Letter” addressed to the Law Offices of
Hyman, Phelps, & McNamara,
P.C. and carbon copied the President of Lancôme. The letter
stated that it appeared Lancôme
had addressed the violations
contained in the September
Warning Letter, but emphasized,
“This letter does not relieve you
or your firm from the responsibility of taking all necessary
steps to assure sustained compliance with the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”15
Given the popularity of
anti-aging products and their
sweeping use of structure/
function
claims,
additional
Warning Letters are likely. The
purpose of an FDA Warning
Letter in terms of litigation remains unclear and the legal industry is beginning to take notice. Attorneys at Venable LLP
point out in their analysis of the
FDA’s warning letter to
Lancôme, “[F]ederal action has
been shown to encourage consumer class action lawsuits.”16
Attorneys at Shook Hardy &
Bacon LLP note, “Plaintiffs will
allege that consumers were defrauded into purchasing the
product because of illegal marketing claims and trumpet those
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same FDA warning letters as
proof that the marketing claims
were deceptive under state consumer fraud statutes.”17
In fact, Warning Letters
are already being used in litigation by plaintiff’s firms. Both
Avon and L’Oreal and subsidiary
Lancôme have been named defendants in multiple proposed
class actions for defrauding consumers, of which the L’Oreal and
Lancôme lawsuit is to be centralized in the District of New Jersey.18 Each of the complaints cite
to the above Warning Letters issued against the companies. With
the potential for growing class
actions lawsuits resulting from
FDA Warning Letters, as Shook
Hardy & Bacon LLP write, cosmetic companies can no longer
afford “to take a sit-back-and-wait
approach.”
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The Future of Genetic Testing and the Legal and Ethical Implications of ENCODE
Melody R. Hsiou
Melhsiou@gmail.com
Advancements in genetics
research are rapidly transforming
the fields of personalized medicine
and population research. These
developments will introduce a
wide range of difficult bioethical
issues and raise many yet unaddressed legal concerns. On September 5, 2012, Nature, Cell, Science, Genome Research, and other
scientific journals released a coordinated publication of thirty articles detailing the groundbreaking
findings of The Encyclopedia of
DNA Elements (ENCODE) consortium.1 The ENCODE consortium represents new research that
for the first time confirms that
over eighty percent of our DNA,
which was once thought of as
“junk” with no function, actually
plays a “critical role in controlling
how cells, tissue, and organs behave.”2 These portions of the genome, once disregarded as nonprotein-coding DNA (ncDNA) are
now being described as genetic
“switches” that may lead to many
discoveries about disease.3
Imagine a patient walking
into his physician’s office, handing the physician a memory stick
and saying: “Here, look at all 3.2
billion base pairs of my DNA and
tell me exactly what caused my
cancer, why it is progressing as it
is, and how you are going to treat
it.” According to Dr. George
Sledge Jr., a past president of the

American Society of Clinical Oncology, this scenario could become a reality in as few as two to
three years.4 Advancements in the
field of genetic testing will
change clinical practices and patient expectations, shift boundaries of medical malpractice law,
expand the meaning of informed
consent, and present new challenges in bioethics and privacy. In
THE ENCODE CONSORTIUM REPRESENTS NEW
RESEARCH THAT FOR THE
FIRST TIME CONFIRMS
THAT OVER EIGHTY
PERCENT OF OUR DNA,
WHICH WAS ONCE
THOUGHT OF AS JUNK
WITH NO FUNCTION,
ACTUALLY PLAYS A
CRITICAL ROLE IN CONTROLLING HOW CELLS,
TISSUE, AND ORGANS
BEHAVE.
order to promote the advancement
of personalized medicine, it will
be important to increase genetics
education and establish professional guidelines that recognize
advancements made in whole genome sequencing while preserving patient confidentiality.
I. Encode: the New Frontier of
Genetic Testing
Technological innovation
has made genetic testing more
accessible and an increasing num-

ber of individuals now have the
opportunity to access and interpret their own genetic information.5 The price of sequencing
an entire human genome is dropping rapidly and it may soon cost
a consumer only $1,000 for an
entire genetic blueprint.6 This
genetic blueprint can reveal predispositions to cancer, diabetes,
and even psychiatric conditions.7
The cost of sequencing the entire
genome, consisting of more than
20,000 genes and 6 billion DNA
building blocks, will soon be less
than that to perform individual
tests for cancer or metabolic disease.8
Whole genome sequencing has already made promising
developments in the field of targeted gene therapy.9 In 2009, the
Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center conducted a phase II
trial of the kidney cancer drug
Everolimus on patients with
bladder cancer.10 Although the
trial was unsuccessful overall,
one patient (Patient X) responded remarkably well to the drug
and went into complete remission.11 The researchers then used
array-based tools to perform a
targeted search of the Patient X’s
tumor DNA for mutations and
variations.12 When that did not
produce significant results, they
sequenced the tumor’s entire genome to detect potential biomarkers.13 This whole genome
sequencing revealed that there
were indeed two mutations
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unique to Patient X.14 Upon referencing previous studies, scientists discovered that one of these
mutations had been shown to
sensitize patients to the same
protein that is targeted by Everolimus, likely deducing the
source of Patient X’s positive
response.15 Scientists believe
that experiments in this vein can
continue to identify previously
undetected subtypes of disease
that can then be targeted and
treated through personalized
therapies.16
Whole genome sequencing is likely to be used increasingly as a discovery platform.17
Namely, the federal government
spent $288 million to support
development of the Encyclopedia
of
DNA
Elements
(ENCODE), an international research collaboration that follows
up on and supplements the Human Genome Project (HGP).18
The goal of the HGP, an international, collaborative research
program jointly managed by the
U.S. Department of Energy and
the National Institutes of Health,
was to map and sequence the
genes of the human body.19 In
2003, the HGP was successfully
completed.20 ENCODE now
aims to provide a deeper understanding of the “functional” elements of the genome and serve
as a catalog of these segments.21
One of ENCODE’s most
ground-breaking discoveries is
that certain non-protein coding
regions serve much larger functions than previously thought.22

So far, four million switches, also
called transcription factors or
“regulatory genes,” have been discovered.23 Study results found
that regulatory genes are responsible for common diseases such as
Crohn’s disease and about 17 various types of cancer. 24 Gaining
understanding of these networks
of genetic switches may prove to
provide new targets for drug therapy and greatly expand personalized medicine.25 Namely, genome
-based research will eventually
allow scientists to develop highly
effective diagnostic tests to better
understand the health needs of
people based on their unique genetic make-ups, and to design personalized treatments for diseases.26
Laboratories and clinicians will benefit from collaborating to understand the relationships
between sequence variations and
health conditions within the context of ENCODE’s findings. Clinical decisionmakers will be also
need to take these findings into
account in order to avoid inappropriate recommendations that may
cause patient harm.27 As data on
current practices on genetics reporting and its impact on health
outcomes continues to accumulate, it will be important to survey
these practices and how they link
to patient outcomes. These new
discoveries will reshape the
boundaries of medicine and
should be taken into account
when addressing legal and bioethical quandaries that will inevitably arise as whole genome se-

quencing becomes more prevalent.
II. The Changing Landscape of
Liability
The possibility of linking DNA
variations with health conditions
will result in unprecedented ways
to predict and treat diseases.28 In
a pilot study Mike Snyder, the
head of the Center for Genomics
and Personalized Medicine at
Stanford University, decided to
sequence his own genome in order to demonstrate the capabilities
of personal genomics.29 Snyder
explained that he wanted to sequence his DNA to see if it would
predict conditions that he might
be at risk for, particularly those
that were not evident from his
family history.30 The sequencing
revealed that the seemingly
healthy Snyder was at high risk
for type 2 diabetes.31 Snyder stated that he believed that the early
detection would allow him to
manage the risk through diet and
increased exercise, thereby mitigating an otherwise debilitating
disease.32
Although advancements in
whole genome research will play
a role in making medicine more
preventative, personalized and
effective, there are significant
gaps in the U.S. system of genetic
testing oversight that can lead to
harms.33 Further, customs in the
genomics industry are not yet fully developed.34 As genetic testing
continues to grow exponentially,
the number of qualified clinical
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geneticists and genetic counselors
is unlikely to meet the demand,
and an increasing amount of general physicians may be expected to
offer, interpret and convey genetic
tests results.35 Thus, increased validation and acceptance of genetic
testing in clinical practice could
result in a challenging time for
physicians.36 Physicians will be at
the forefront of genetics medicine
and may be faced with changing
forms of liability for medical malpractice, lack of informed consent,
and the legal duty to warn.
III. Medical Malpractice: Standard of Care
As physicians incorporate
genetic services into their practice,
the framework for analyzing medical malpractice cases will change.
Medical malpractice claims are
based on negligence37 and must
include a duty owed by the physician to his patient, a breach of that
duty, causation, and damages.38
The physician-patient duty is
unique in that it is upheld if the
physician meets the required
standard of care.39 Generally, the
standard of care is measured by
the level of care demonstrated by
other physicians in the same field
in terms of skill, knowledge and
care.40
Genetics knowledge, skills,
and abilities vary greatly across
the discipline, making it difficult
to make standard of care determinations. In a survey of six allied
healthcare training programs, 78
percent of graduates reported that

they received marginal to no instruction on genetics knowledge
and skills.41 However, even
though they had minimal levels
of genetics education, these professionals were still responsible
for providing clinical services
relevant to genetics, such as taking family genetic histories and
counseling patients on the genetic
basis for the disorders.42 As the
personal
genomics
industry
grows, it will be important for
primary care providers to equip
themselves with the necessary
AS PHYSICIANS INCORPORATE GENETIC SERVICES
INTO THEIR PRACTICE,
THE FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYZING MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CASES
WILL CHANGE.
knowledge and skills to assess
patients’ situations. The wide
range of genetics care providers,
ranging from geneticists who
have medical degrees to laboratory technicians, implies that some
types of providers may be more
qualified than others depending
on the nature of the test and the
complexity of the condition at
issue.43
Currently, the American
Medical Association (AMA) predicts that only ten percent of physicians possess the requisite
knowledge to use genetic testing.44 Due to the low percentage
of general physicians who offer
genetic testing services, it may be

difficult to establish a standard
of care that would give rise to
liability for failure to administer
genetic testing services.45 However, as more genetic tests for
common chronic disorders become incorporated into primary
practice, even health care professionals who do not have specialized training in genetics may
be held to the same standard of
care as clinical geneticists. This
may impose general practitioners with a heightened standard
of care and resulting malpractice
cases that they are not prepared
to prevent.
This issue is compounded by the fact that patients may
be more confident in their primary physicians’ ability to convey genetic services than statistics should currently suggest.46
The AMA reported in a survey
that over 60 percent of respondents would choose their primary
care doctor as their first consultant on genetic disorders.47 In
addition, about 80 percent reported feeling “very confident”
or “somewhat confident” that
their primary care provider
could advise them or their family members about risk for developing inherited cancer, counsel
them about available genetic
tests, and interpret results from
the test.48 However, a separate
study conducted by the National
Cancer Institute concluded that
only 40 percent of primary care
physicians and 57 percent of tertiary care physicians felt that
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they were qualified to recommend genetic testing for cancer
susceptibility to their patients.49
Studies have shown that
the level of genetics knowledge
of the primary care provider
greatly determines willingness
to offer genetic testing and services.50 Attitudes and acceptance
of testing are also dependent on
complex balancing tests of the
benefits, risks, and costs of genetic testing.51 Notably, providers will be faced with the challenge of constantly maintaining
knowledge of what tests are currently available, and how accurate and valid the tests are.52 The
burden of attaining rapidly
changing knowledge about genetics, including new findings
that come from ENCODE, may
prove to be a deterrent for providers who do not wish to incur
liability for care related to genetic services.53
Further, even if a physician purports not to offer genetics services, plaintiffs may still
succeed in bringing a case under
the current standard of care. If
there is sufficient knowledge in
the medical community that a
certain set of gene mutations
cause a particular disease to develop, and the physician does
not follow up with a patient
whose medical records show
these gene mutations, which in
turn lead to that patient’s injuries, the physician could face
liability under this standard.54
The physician may argue that
due to his limited background in

genetics related care, medical custom would not dictate him to follow up with his patient regarding
the predicted disease.55 However,
if a reasonable person, given the
prominence of the predictive test,
would have conducted follow up
care, medical custom may not
prescribe the outcome.56 This reasonable person objective standard
has been applied by at least one
court in a medical malpractice
setting.57 In Helling v. Carey, the
court stated that although an early
glaucoma detection technique using air puffs tests was not in routine use by ophthalmologists, the
court could impose liability for
breaching the standard of care.58
The court stated that “irrespective
of its disregard by the standards
of the ophthalmology profession,
it is the duty of the courts to say
what is required to protect patients.”59 Under this same reasoning, the lifesaving potential of genetic testing and follow up care
could lead courts to impose liability for physicians who fail to utilize available testing and care.
Physicians who do choose
to offer genetic testing services
will be exposed to even more
forms of liability. For example,
they could be held liable for an
incorrect interpretation of test results and for recommending a
suitable course of treatment or
drug therapy. Further, physicians
will have to consider the fact that
simply revealing genetic information to patients could have unexpected effects on the patients’
psyche.60 To prevent these situa-

tions, it will be crucial for physicians to establish obtain informed
consent with patients before engaging in genetics services.
IV. Recommendations: Increased Education and Uniform
Standards
Newly emerging genetic
discoveries and testing techniques
such as whole genome sequencing are likely to be accompanied
by an onslaught of litigation previously unseen by physicians and
courts. Presently, the majority of
physicians is not adequately
trained and educated about advancements in genetic research
and may be unaware of legal consequences. Currently, no state or
federal laws exist to address
whole genome sequence data
comprehensively, while specific
laws designed to protect genetic
information in general typically
address where the data is collected and by whom, but may or may
not offer protection.61 In order to
assist the medical community to
adopt these valuable new resources, as well as to provide
courts with a suggested standard
of care, it will be important to incentivize increased genetics education and a set of uniform medical practice guidelines.
The development of practice guidelines and protocols for
testing will help physicians by
providing a reference for the
changing standard of care and
serve as strategies for patient
management and clinical decision
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making. In addition to helping
physicians with decision making
in patient care management, courts
may benefit from having these
practice guidelines in malpractice
litigation as a reference to the current standard of care. This will
help promote efficiency and uniformity and reduce wasteful litigation that may deter physicians
from incorporating genetic counseling and testing into their practices. These guidelines may also
be used for patient education and
could possibly lower the risk of
physician liability by resolving
ambiguity as to the governing
standard. Genetic malpractice actions may force physicians either
to overuse genetic diagnostic testing to defend against genetic malpractice suits or to avoid genetic
services altogether by making
blanket referrals.62 Without such
policies and guidelines physicians
may fear litigation and may not be
able act responsibly, leaving
courts with the burden of determining when a duty exists. With
both the medical and legal communities better prepared for the
obstacles that will accompany
newly emerging genetic technologies, the genetic revolution can
continue to make unprecedented
breakthroughs in personalized
care.
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Are You In Or Out?
A Possible Solution to the United States’ Organ Donation Crisis
Robert Granzen
Robgranzen@gmail.com
Currently, laws in the United States assume a person has not
consented to organ donation absent
express consent by the person or
by a family member. The burden
of obtaining consent is largely
placed on health care professionals.1 However, a majority of states
have experimented with “opt out”
provisions for certain organs from
the 1960’s to the early 2000’s.2
These presumed consent statutes
assumed that a decedent had consented to the posthumous donation
of organs, unless an objection was
made by either the person while
alive or by a family member after
the person’s death.3 Since the 2006
Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, which eliminated the presumed consent provisions found in
the 1987 version, states have uniformly abandoned presumed consent statutes in favor of less controversial--and arguably less effective--means of organ procurement.4 However, the rest of the
world has not followed. Many
countries in Europe and the Middle
East have included “opt out” provisions in their organ donation
laws.5 While a delicate balance
must be achieved between presumed consent’s effectiveness of
organ donation and the ethical concerns raised in an “opt- out” system, today’s tired and ineffective
system of organ donation is in desperate need of an overhaul, and
presumed consent statutes may be

an effective remedy.
The shortage of organs in
the United States is a monumental
crisis for patients and physicians
alike. Although 95% of the national population indicates support for organ donation, only 42%
have committed to be organ and
tissue donors.6 The gap between
the supply of available organs and
the patients needing a transplant
widens each year. Over the last 25
ALTHOUGH 95% OF THE
NATIONAL POPULATION
INDICATES SUPPORT FOR
ORGAN DONATION, ONLY
42% HAVE COMMITTED
TO BE ORGAN AND
TISSUE DONORS
years, the number of transplants
more than doubled, but the waiting list grew about six-fold.7 Today, over 110,000 people are on a
waiting list for an organ, and
roughly 18 of those people will
perish each day.8 In 2011, a total
of 6,669 patients died while waiting desperately for the arrival of a
matching organ.9
Federally Imposed Limitations
To Organ Donation
In promoting different and
more controversial organ donation policies, it is critical to provide the two major influences up-

on state organ donation laws. The
federal government prohibits the
sale of human organs under § 274
(e) of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA).10 NOTA provides that it is “unlawful for any
person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects
interstate commerce.” While
seemingly straightforward on its
face, NOTA affects many other
types of possible organ procurement legislation that are less controversial than a blatant sale of an
organ. Various proposed benefits
for organ donors including half
price drivers licenses, estate tax
credits, and partial coverage of
funeral expenses could run afoul
with NOTA’s ban on valuable
consideration for organs.
Similarly, the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)
was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and attempted to harmonize state laws regarding organ donation.12 While
itself not legally binding, history
has shown that the UAGA heavily influences state legislation.
The UAGA was originally enacted in 1968 and was promptly
adopted by all 50 states.13 The
first revision was in 1987 and
more than half of the states
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adopted the revision in full.14 The
latest revision, occurring in 2007,
has been adopted by over 30
states.
History of Presumed Consent
Legislation in the United States
Presumed consent statutes
were present in nearly every state
from the 1960’s to the early
2000’s. The statutes were initially
intended as a way to address the
serious shortage of corneas and
organs throughout the nation.15
While most of the early statutes
were limited to cornea or pituitary
gland removal, the implications
were drastic.16 Seven years after
Georgia adopted a presumed consent statute, the number of cornea
transplants skyrocketed from 25 to
1,000.17 During a nine-year period
after Florida enacted a presumed
consent statute, cornea transplants
increased from 500 to 3000.18
Similarly, in Alabama, presumed
consent statutes resulted in the
state having more corneas than it
needed for transplantation.19
Despite the success of the
presumed consent statutes, federal
courts began hearing complaints
about certain states’ statutes violating due process. Firstly, in
Brotherton v. Cleveland, the Sixth
Circuit found the wife of the decedent had a property right over the
cornea and organs.20 The wife of
the decedent had informed the hos-

pital that she did not consent to
an anatomical gift.21 Nevertheless, the coroner’s office removed
the decedent’s corneas without
inquiring about any possible objection.22 The 6th Circuit, in interpreting the Ohio presumed
consent statute, found that the
wife of the decedent clearly had a
possessory right to the body and
an anatomical gift could not be
made with the presence of her
objection.23 Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit found a procedural due
process right in regards to the removal of organs.24 In Newman v.
A TWENTY-TWOCOUNTRY COMPARISON
INDICATED THAT PRESUMED CONSENT STATUTES MAY INCREASE ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
BY 25-30%.
Sathyavaglswaran, a coroner
avoided any efforts to speak with
family members about the removal of organs so he could not be
halted by any objections.25 The
circuit court once again concluded that a procedural due process
right exists when dealing with the
removal of organs. However, in
both of these cases, the rights
awarded to the plaintiffs by the
courts were already given to the
plaintiffs in the presumed consent
statutes. These cases were not a
referendum by the courts as to the
validity of “opt out” provisions,

but merely a strict statutory interpretation of the presumed
consent statutes themselves.
Nonetheless, the drafters of the
2006 UAGA eliminated presumed consent provisions, citing
multiple lawsuits regarding
property rights of surviving family members as their reasoning.26
Subsequent state organ donation
statutes began eliminating their
presumed consent provisions.
Current State Approaches Intending To Increase Organ
Donation Are Insufficient
After the numerous lawsuits nationwide challenging
presumed consent provisions,
states began introducing new
methods to increase the numbers
of donors. Initially, a few states
gave public recognition and honors to organ donors. The Maine
legislature passed an Organ Donor Awareness Day in 1999,
making December 3rd a day in
which the Governor of Maine
publicly recognizes one donor,
recipient, or listed person per
year during the Organ Donor
Awareness Day celebration.27 In
New York, Governor Pataki
signed legislation establishing
the New York State Gift of Life
Medal of Honor program.28 The
program
was
created
to
“recognize the selfless lifesaving contributions of organ

PAGE 47

SETON HALL HEALTH LAW OUTLOOK

Continued...
and tissue donors.”29 A medal is
presented to families of deceased donors and to the living
donors of organs, bone, bone
marrow, and blood stem cells.30
More recently, a number
of state legislatures are attempting to enact statutes forcing people to contemplate organ donation. In 2008, Governor Codey
passed the “New Jersey Hero
Act.”31 The act requires New
Jersey residents, when applying
for a driver’s license, to make a
decision regarding organ donation. 32 If a person does not wish
to become a donor or designate a
decision maker on their behalf,
they must check off a box acknowledging that they have reviewed the importance of making an organ donation decision.33
To further the consent of donation, the act requires mandatory
organ donation education for
high school students. The Act
also provides for a much needed
online donor registry via electronic signatures.34
Similarly, in 2012, the
New York legislature passed
“Lauren’s Law” aimed at increasing the low number of organ donors through its driver’s
license applications.35
The
measure would change the application of a driver’s license and
include a section that applicants
“must fill out” by either joining
the organ donor registry or
choosing to “skip this ques-

tion.”36 A member of the Save
Lives Now New York Foundation, who pushed for the measure,
explained, “We want people to
just have a momentary contemplation of the decision, even if the
decision is that they don’t want to
help right now.” 37
However, the inclusions of
the aforementioned provisions
have only gradually affected the
donor rate in the respective states.
While the Hero Act raised the donor rate from 18 to 31 percent,
New Jersey is still 11 points behind the national average of 42
percent.38 With 95 percent of the
national population supporting
organ donation, but only 42 percent of that population designating themselves as organ donors, it
is clear that “opt in” provisions
relying on the generosity of donors are insufficient.
Presumed Consent Provisions
Found in Europe and Asia Have
Been Effective
In Europe and Asia, where
organ shortages are comparable to
the United States, many countries
have adopted presumed consent
provisions. A twenty-two country
comparison indicated that presumed consent statutes may increase organ transplantation by 25
-30%.39 Singapore first performed
a kidney transplant in 1970, but
shortly thereafter found its voluntary system of organ donation was

not supplying enough organs.40 In
June of 1987, Singapore passed
the Human Organ Transplant Act,
instilling a system of presumed
consent limited to kidney donations.41 After the adoption of presumed consent provisions, kidney
procurement jumped from 4.7 per
year to 31.3.42 Spain’s presumed
consent provision, which has
helped Spain attain the world’s
highest rate of actual donation,
considers any decedent a possible
donor as long as a formally registered opposition has not been
filed.43 Belgium passed a similar
law in 1987 and, after twenty
years of implementation, less than
2 percent of the Belgian population registered an objection to
their status of organ donor.44 Similarly, Austria has enacted provisions that procure organs irrespective of relative’s objections
so long as a registered objection
had not been filed.45 The procurement rate quadrupled within 8
years of the provision and is currently twice as high as the procurement rate in the United
States.46 Conversely, when Denmark switched from an “opt out”
provision to an “opt in” provision,
donation rate fell by 50 percent.47
Presumed Consent Statutes Are
An Effective Remedy to the
United State’s Organ Shortage
While advances in technology and medicine have kept
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people alive much longer than in
the past, similar progress in organ
donation policy has not followed.
With waiting lists growing larger
each year, policies reliant on altruism and tragedy have proven insufficient. Federal courts have
made clear that a due process right
exists in the removal of organs.
However, an “opt out” system
does not violate such a right—it
embraces it. Statutes requiring an
honest effort by doctors and hospital administrators in finding dissenters within the family further
the constitutional rights of the decedent along with family members
and ensure the best possible
chance of harvesting invaluable
organs. A presumed consent statute does not foreclose someone’s
wishes against donating organs if
they did not elect to opt out; rather, their wishes live on with their
family. With Europe and other
parts of the world adapting successful and progressive presumed
consent statutes, the United States
should adapt a similar system. The
110,000 people on the waiting list
deserve it.
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